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Preface
The three papers presented here have as th e ir  common concern tech­
nology, which is seen as a way of taking up w ith the world. Each focuses 
upon an aspect o f meaning or value in the technologicai epoch.
The f i r s t  paper, "Marx's View o f Technology", exp licates the notions 
which Marx held of technology, w ith in  the context o f the in d u s tria l re ­
volution o f the 19th Century. Thus, the paper deals w ith the place and 
meaning o f technology as an In d u stria l phenomenon. I then go on to  sug­
gest the advantages and disadvantages o f such a view when applied  to our 
own century and s itu a tio n .
In "The Diminishment o f the S e lf in Labor" I investigate  in depth the 
c r is is  o f meaning and value which arises in that which is the d ire c t de­
scendant o f the technology Marx analyzed, i show the e ffe c ts  o f th is  
p a r t ic u la r ly  b ru ta l form o f technology upon the s e l f ,  and how meaning Is 
prevented from a ris in g  in th is  form, i . e . ,  in labor.
F in a lly , In 'The Development o f W ittgenste in 's  Notions Concerning 
E th ics", I examine the co rre la tio n  o f meaning and value In e th ics  and 
technology, in delineating  W ittgenste in 's  e th ica l position I fin d  that 
W ittgenstein holds to a crucia l dichotomy between value and fa c t;  i f  th is  
dichotomy were the most fe lic ito u s  way to d ivide re a l ity  i t  would pre­
sent an objection to my position in the second paper. I show how W ittgen­
s te in 's  e a r l ie r  position is untenable, and how indeed, he him self comes to  
re jec t his e a r l ie r  pos ition . I then b r ie f ly  suggest a form fo r  W ittgenste in 's  
la te r  e th ica l views (extrapolated from his general philosophical position ) 
and propose a te n ta tiv e  c r itic is m  of them.
I i
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PART I
MARX'X VIEW OF TECHNOLOGY
Marx's most e x p lic i t  views on technology are those remarks 
d irected  towards d e lin eatin g  the place o f the machine In the de­
velopment o f the c a p ita l is t  mode o f production. In Capital » on 
the one hand, Marx very s t r ic t ly  lim its  him self to  those factors  
w ith in  the context o f the h is to r ic a l development o f the c a p ita l is t  
mode o f production. Thus Marx's conception o f technology Is de­
termined by Its  place w ith in  th is  development, and what might be 
said In reaction to  I t .  In the Grundrisse, on the other hand, we 
find  Marx's purpose more broadly defined; his comments are both 
notes leading up to C a p ita l, and more w idely speculative notes on 
technology per se and its  meaning.
Let us f i r s t  consider the movement w ith in  technology, the 
h is to r ic a l s h if t  Marx exp licates  from H an d icra ft, to Manufacture, 
to Modern Industry.^ At the base o f Marx's analysis of cap ita lism  
l ie s  the labor theory o f value. In the c a p ita l is t  mode o f produc­
tion  a l l  value (as an economic e n t ity )  In a thing comes, fo r Marx, 
from the quantity  o f labor-tim e put in to  Its  production, I ts  forma­
tion  from a natural object to a man-made product. Marx d istinguishes  
two kinds of value^, use-value, which is the value a thing has in 
Its  use, and value proper or exchange-value, which is the value of a 
thing when I t  Is exchanged fo r some other commodity. Marx views the 
exchange-value o f a th in g , "the magnitude o f the value o f any a r t ic le " ,  
as "the amount of labour s o c ia lly  necessary fo r Its  production."^
Marx is here abstracting  from the things themselves to  a rr iv e  a t an
I
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2
economic conception. "As values, a l l  commodities are only d e f in ite  
masses o f congealed labour-tim e."^
From th is  we can see that the productiveness o f  labor is the 
greater, the less labor-tim e is involved in production, the less the 
amount o f c ry s ta lliz e d  labor-tim e in the product.^ The value o f  a 
commodity depends d ire c t ly  upon how much labor-tim e is involved in its  
production, or how great the p ro d u c tiv ity  o f  the la b o re r.& Now i f  the 
aim o f the c a p ita l is t  is posited as that o f turning a p r o f i t ,  o r o f 
turning the greatest p ro f it^ ,  then his purpose in the production o f  
commodities is to cheapen them, by means o f reducing labor costs per 
commodity, and thus increasing the d iffe ren c e  between labor costs and 
s e llin g  p r ic e , increasing the exchange value.
In Manufacture commodities can be cheapened by increasing laboring  
hours w ithout increasing wages; the laborer thus produces what he is paid 
in a sm aller fra c tio n  o f to ta l lab o r-tlm e , and the o*mer keeps the la rg e r  
surplus-value ( i . e . ,  the d ifference between costs to him and v a lu e ) .*  This 
tendency is seen by Marx to lead to I ts  h is to r ic a l conclusion in the ma-
g
chine. Machines cheapen commodities, and increase surplus-value thereby. 
While not downgrading the importance o f  th is  fac to r as an impetus, inso­
fa r  as i t  concerns the c a p ita l is t  and his m otivations, we w il l  see that 
Marx understood there to be, as w e ll ,  something lik e  an 'in te rn a l lo g ic ',  
or momentum, to mechanization, to technology.
Marx had an 'o rgan ic ' view o f  the time preceding the Manufacture 
era ; the workman was united w ith his to o ls , and was in touch w ith  the 
continuum o f production, i f  not d ire c tin g  i t .  In C a p ita l, where Marx 
is mainly concerned w ith the more immediate s h if t  from manufacture to 
modern Industry , and its  im plications fo r c a p ita l,  we can pinpoint 
some o f the changes involved in that s h i f t .  Industry was hindered
*The c a p ita liz a tio n  o f 'Manufacture' (and o f ''H and icraft' and 'Modern 
Industry in the sequel) conforms to the p ractice  o r  Marx's tra n s la to rs .
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from advancement as long as the instruments o f production were dependent 
upon the personal s k i l ls  and strengths o f the d e ta il workmen in Manu­
fac tu re , and the manual laborers in H and icra ft.^  i t  is in Manufacture 
that we see "the Immediate technical foundation o f Modern Industry. 
Manufacture produced the machinery by means o f which Modern Industry  
abolished the hand icra ft and manufacturing systems In those spheres o f 
production th a t i t  f i r s t  seized upon."^^
The m otivating force o f th is  s h if t  from Manufacture to  Industry  
consisted o f the technical requirements o f the system, o f the process 
of production which was being developed, as w ell as the impetus towards 
g reater p ro f its .  At a ce rta in  stage o f development Industry becomes 
incompatible w ith  that from which i t  arose. H andicraft and Manufacture.
The increasing s ize  o f the prime movers, o f the transm itting  
mechanism, and o f the machinery proper, the greater complica­
t io n , m u ltifo rm ity  and re g u la r ity  o f the d e ta ils  o f these machines, 
as they more and more departed from the model o f those o r ig in a lly  
made by manual labour, and acquired a form, untrammelled ex­
cept by the conditions under which they worked, the p erfec tin g  
of the automatic system, and the use, every day more unavoidable, 
o f a more re fra c to ry  m a te ria l, such as iron instead o f wood— 
the so lu tion  o f a l l  these problems, which sprang up by force of 
circumstances, everywhere met w ith  a stumbling-block in the 
personal re s tr ic t io n s , which even the c o lle c tiv e  labour o f Manu­
facture could not break through, except to  a lim ited  ex ten t.
What Marx c le a r ly  sees in the development o f Industry is the co­
herence and momentum of technology. In Manufacture there are inde­
pendent d e ta il machines, which emphasize the d iv is io n  of labor among 
workmen. Technology u ltim a te ly  works to  upset th is  s u b je c tiv ity , th is  
unconnectedness.12 With technology there is a chain or process which 
the subject o f labor (the product) undergoes, each d e ta il supplementing 
the la s t. While th is  connectedness o f a complete process is correct 
when applied to  one fa c to ry , or w ith in  an industry, Marx c le a r ly  sees 
that the log ic  of technology demands the whole system, the complete
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social mode o f production. He sees that a revolution  in production in 
industry and ag ric u ltu re  make i t  necessary and In ev ita b le  th a t a revolu­
tion  take place in more general and fa r-reach in g  terms, in means o f com­
munication and tran sp o rt, fo r e x a m p l e . ^ 3
Furthermore Marx finds in the s h if t  from Handicraft to  Manufacture 
to Modern Industry a s h if t  in the placement o f the worker. We sha ll 
deal w ith th is  below. The movement is from the su b jec tive , unorganized 
connections among d e ta il workers (where a d iv is io n  o f labor Is s trong ), 
to  the o b je c tiv e , ra tio n a l deployment o f men and machines in a coopera- 
t iv e  venture prescribed by technical necessity and the instrument o f 
labor i t s e l f .
We see most c le a r ly  in the Grundrisse how i t  is that the means o f 
production created under ca p ita l may even tu a lly  work to  the downfall 
of c a p ita l. F irs t  of a l l  one of the in te rn a l requirements o f technology 
is that the process be a continuum, and that the d iv is io n  o f labor, 
upon which the c a p ita l is t  mode of production is based, is in e v ita b ly  
undercut.1  ̂ Moreover, there is a s h i f t ,  w ith  the adaptation o f tech­
nology by c a p ita l,  in the r a t io  o f v a r ia b le -c a p ita l,  o r , in other words, 
the s h if t  from worker primacy in production to machine primacy- The 
g rea te r the development o f f ix e d -c a p ita l (machines), the g rea te r the 
im perative is fo r a constant flow o f reproduction (production ), or a 
continuous production process. Hence we have a t th is  period the de­
velopment o f tw enty-four hour production. Money is wasted when the 
machines are id le .1&  A continuous production process becomes necessary 
fo r the c a p ita l is t  mode o f production, because the value o f f ix e d -  
cap ita l is rea lized  only in production. W ealth, which is the surplus 
time that the laborer spends over the time necessary fo r his subsistence, 
tends, in industry, towards being created not by labor-tim e, but rather
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by technology, by f ix e d ~ c a p ita l. In the transform ation, the production
process, the laborer as ind iv idual is no longer the ch ie f a c to r, as
Marx notes In the Grundrisse. and
i t  is n e ith er the d ire c t human labour he h im self performs, nor 
the time during which he works, but rather the appropriation  of 
his own general productive power, his understanding o f nature  
and his mastery over i t  by v ir tu e  o f h is presence as a social 
body— i t  is . In a word, the development o f the social Ind iv idual 
which appears as the foundation-stone o f production and w ealth .
Labor, then, ceases to be the measure o f w ea lth , and machines or tech­
nology step in to  serve as the means of producing surp lus-value.
I w il l  now consider the s h if t  from H a n d ic ra ft, to  Manufacture, to  
Industry, from the point of view o f the w orker's experience. What e f ­
fects  does the s h if t  in technology (understood here as the production 
process) through these h is to r ic a l periods have, in e x p e rie n tia l terms, 
from the perspective o f the worker?
Marx notes that some p o lit ic a l  economists considered the tool a 
simple machine, or a machine a complex to o l . This d e f in it io n  he con­
siders inadequate because the " h is to ric a l element" is wanting. He states  
th a t indeed in examining the machine we find  there is gen era lly  some­
thing that is l ik e  ( in  e f fe c t ,  i f  not in form) the tools o f the workman 
in H and icraft. There is a d iffe re n c e , however, and that is that " in ­
stead of being human implements, they are the implements o f a mechanism, 
or mechanical implements".^9 So the machine takes the tool from the 
workman, performing much the same function form erly performed by h i m . 20 
The machine, however, overcomes human lim its  In a number o f ways. I t  
can bring a much greater number o f " to o ls" In to  play simultaneously and 
use them continuously.^^ This Is the main th ru st o f machinery a t the 
beginning, to do a greater quantity  of the same thing the workman does ; 
many machines were modelled, then, on human a c t iv ity  in production.
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This, however, concerns the machine only in its  introductory phases 
as a fac to r o f production and we soon have progressed to the point at 
which machines are modelled purely w ith  regard to the production process. 
We have then transgressed q u a lita t iv e ly  the lim ita tio n s  o f ind iv idu al 
laborers. The only apparent re s tr ic t io n s , in th is  regard, are the 
a d a p ta b ility  o f m ateria ls  and the goal o f the production process (the  
in ten tion  o f form ).
We must go fu rth e r , however, in p inpointing  the log ic o f machine- 
development. The developing machine technology was formed and guided 
by the developing character o f consumer goods. This character Is that 
of a device. The device character o f consumer goods and the developing
character o f machines were both techno log ica l, and were both in te rtw ined .
22Both, as w e ll ,  remain p a ra s it ic  upon the p re -tech n o lo g ica l.
There are a number o f e ffe c ts  o f machinery Marx documents which 
are p a r t ic u la r ly  relevant to  19th Century England, to the p a r t ic u la r  
conjunction o f the developments o f cap ita lism  and Industry. Machinery 
dispenses w ith  muscle power and there fo re  tended to promote the em­
ployment o f women and children (who would work fo r sm aller wages than 
a man, as w e l l ) . 23 The introduction o f the machine led to  a physical
d e te rio ra tio n  o f the worker and a high m o rta lity  rate^^, and to  moral 
25degradation. Machines also tended to  prolong rather than shorten the 
working day, as we have already m e n t i o n e d . 26
The beginning o f the In d u stria l period may be characterized genera lly  
as a com petition between the laborer and the machine, one in which the 
laborer was fated  to  lose. As Marx s ta te s , "the seIf-expansion of 
cap ita l by means of machinery is therefore  d ire c t ly  proportional to the 
number of workpeople, whose means of live lih o o d  has been destroyed by
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m a c h i n e r y . "27 This does not necessarily  mean unemployment fo r large
numbers o f people, but i t  does indeed seem to point to  movement between
d iffe re n t  jobs and between various liv in g  p laces, and general social
28m o b ility  or uprootedness.
Although factors such as these are dep lorab le. I t  Is necessary to  
point out th a t such conditions are not generally  or always those of 
technology, but are those o f a p a r t ic u la r  period In which the h is to r ic a l  
change from one dominant mode and process o f production is p a r t ic u la r ly  
vicious and upsetting . Thus the Introduction o f machinery on a massive 
level may be more or less destructive  o f a p a rt ic u la r  social s tru c tu re , 
but Its  long term e ffe c ts  may be regarded as b e n e fic ia l. In terms of 
greater p ro d u c tiv ity , less physically  exhausting labor, increased le is u re  
tim e, and so fo r th .29 This reveals a useful (but not ra d ic a l) d is ­
t in c tio n  w ith in  technology, to  w it ,  that technology may be e ith e r  noxious 
or bén éfic ian t (o r , perhaps, b e n i g n ) . F o r  Marx i t  is equally  impor­
tan t to  say that a h is to r ic a l s h if t  is necessary, prescribed by the ob­
je c t iv e ,  m ateria l conditions o f the tim e, as to point out th a t tech­
nology Is advantageous or detrim ental to  the people a t a p a r t ic u la r  point 
In h is to ry . (This Is not to denigrate his compassion fo r those people.)
I t  does, however, then appear (a f te r  the s h if t  is completed), that 
the era o f Modern Industry, and In te n s ifie d  Introduction o f technology, 
make possible what can be a ra tio n a l use or d is tr ib u tio n  or employment 
o f the means o f production, o f technology I t s e l f .  Technology Is seen 
as e s s e n tia lly  a means; and w ith in  the h is to r ic a l development, as i t  pro­
vides more than a minimal level o f subsistence fo r so c ie ty , and as i t  pro­
vides le is u re , i t  opens the p o s s ib ility  fo r  ra tion al d irec tio n  o f those 
means.3i
So Marx has a two-layered view of technology. In its  p a r t ic u la r
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h is to r ic a l generation i t  is taken to be immediately d es tructive  to , or 
s a c r if ic ia l  o f , the laborers at the tim e. Yet i t  is seen more broadly 
as a means, which can be e s s e n tia lly  ben eficen t. I w il l  now o u tlin e  
the major arguments which Marx makes fo r  th is  deeper, more hopeful view.
Marx has been seen to suggest in places th a t technology, the h is ­
to r ic a l development o f the process o f production, is o f g reater force  
than cap ita lism . We have mentioned some o f the o b jective  conditions  
making possible the overthrow of cap ita l ism,3% and these are la rg e ly  
conditions o f technological development. So we may say, a t le a s t, that 
technology and cap ita lism  enter into a d ia le c t ic a l re la tio n s h ip ; but i t  
appears to be a re la tio n s h ip  from which only technology can emerge un­
scathed.
Part o f the cause o f th is  is the d isso lu tion  of the d iv is io n  o f 
labor; another is the movement towards value being created by technology 
rather than surplus labor t i m e . 33 Marx points out in the Grundrisse 
th a t the machine appropriates liv in g  l a b o r , 34 the sense o f science's  
knowledge o f nature and its  technological ap p lica tio n .^ ^  Machinery is 
seen in th is  passage as taking advantage o f the d iv is ion  o f labor, in 
which human labor has been broken in to  increasingly more mechanical move­
ments, which are u ltim a te ly  adaptable to a machine's performance o f them. 
This is , however, before the account o f the f in a l placement of the 
laborer w ith regard to the machine, which Marx la te r  refers to as being 
one o f d irec tin g  or operating , although w ith in  the narrow confines of 
the machine's requirements. We might say that the laborer comes to ru le  
the machine in the in d u s tria l process o f production, but i t  is an a l l  
or nothing ru le , i t  is a uni functional re la tio n s h ip , in which the laborer 
can only "push the button or not". He is not less important than a 
part of the machine (the process), but he is no more important e ith e r .
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Any g re a te r, or more manifold re la tio n s h ip  between the man and the 
machine is ruled o u t, a t leas t on an everyday le v e l. ^
Let us consider what Marx means when he says that " In  Manufacture 
the organ ization  o f the social labour-process is purely su b jec tive ; i t  
is a combination o f  d e ta il labourers; in its  machinery system. Modern 
Industry has a productive organism that is purely o b je c tiv e , in which 
the worker becomes a mere appendage to an already ex is tin g  m ateria l
c o n d i t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n . " 3 7
There are two s tra in s  in Marx's thought throughout the short pas­
sage th is  statement is contained in . One notes the movement from 
" ru le  o f thumb" to "conscious ap p lica tio n  o f science" and the "s u b s ti­
tu tio n  o f  natural forces fo r human fo rc e ."  The other is a growing 
necessity o f associated labor, or labor in common; i . e . ,  a social form 
o f labor or process o f production, in which the "co-operative character 
o f the labour-process is ,"  " . . .  a technical necessity d ic ta ted  by the 
instrument o f labour i t s e l f . "3® We also have recourse to Marx's s ta te ­
ment that production by machinery necessitates tha t the process as a 
whole be examined o b je c tiv e ly ; i . e . ,  w ithout regard to its  execution  
by human hands.
Industry, then, c a p ita l is t  or o therw ise, has a productive o r ­
ganism which is purely o b je c tiv e , meaning that the laborer is adapted 
to the machine. This problem is one o f technology and not merely cap­
ita lis m . The problem, as Marx sees i t ,  is how to make the laborer 
re a liz e  h is o b jec tive  condition , his subjugation to the machine, and 
how fo r him to control the process, how to make the process consciously
regulated by men, by l a b o r e r s .
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So Marx sees here that there is a problem w ith regulating  the 
modern process o f production, technological production, and th is  is not 
simply a question o f changing the ownership and control o f the means o f 
production, but rather o f changing (what appears to be more basic as 
regards th is  problem) the re la tionsh ips  o f laborer and machine, o f man 
and technology. But th is  is less e a s ily  said than done. For the re ­
la tio n sh ip  is not simply one of man and o b je c t, laborer and machine.
We cannot simply reassert the machine as an object o f our in te n tio n s , 
bend i t  to  our w i l ls .  This may indeed be an answer towards making 
technology less noxious as regards man. But when we regard technology 
as a force w ith in  man, a way o f thought o r o f being, as the way in which 
we define r e a l i t y ,  we see that i t  is more d i f f i c u l t  to  change, less 
accessible to  t in k e rin g . For when we set about changing the process 
of production, or adapting a machine to our requirements, we may suc­
ceed in making i t  more 'humane', but we do so in a technological manner, 
and remain subservient to  the unthought basis o f technology. We may 
then, by correcting  a minor malfunction o f technology, only a l l  the more 
assert i ts  predominance.^^ This view, c e r ta in ly  wider than M arx's , corrects  
the instrumental view of technology, in s ta tin g  that technology is not 
simply a means to  an end. As a hab it o f thought, technology takes 
genuinely human a c t iv it ie s  and goals , and uproots them from th e ir  t r a ­
d itio n a l contexts.
The question fo r Marx is how to regulate or control technology.
As we have shown above, Marx sees technology as a means, one which is 
v a lu e -fre e , at least to the point th a t i t  can be employed both by 
cap ita lism  and o th er, more d es irab le , social organ izations. His approach 
may be characterized , then, as ins tru m enta lis t; technology is 'nothing  
more than an instrum ent', the values of which can be ra tio n a lly
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determined. "The life -p ro cess  o f so c ie ty , which is based on the pro­
cess o f m ateria l production, does not s t r ip  o f f  its  m ystical v e il  u n til
i t  is treated  as production by fre e ly  associated men, and is consciously
42regulated by them in accordance w ith a s e ttle d  p lan ."  Yet to  c a ll 
Marx's approach to  technology merely an instrumental one misses a good 
daal o f what Marx saw, a lb e it  not e x p l ic i t ly  as technology, as being 
somehow cru c ia l fo r  h is age. The s e n s it iv ity  o f Marx as a social 
s c ie n tis t  is illum inated by a consideration o f his analysis o f money 
and the fetish ism  o f commodities. A demonstration that these two in ­
tertw ined phenomena can be in te rp re ted  as technological w i l l  show that 
although technology is considerably la rg er and d iffe re n t than Marx 
thought, he was s e n s itive  to see the need fo r explanation and an a lys is .
Here we must make a d is tin c tio n  between a thing and a device. A 
device is a 'technological th in g '.  Devices are what things are re ­
duced to  in the technological age, and so devices are p a ra s it ic  of 
th ings. In a device, as opposed to a th in g , there is an unambiguous 
means-end d is t in c tio n . A device is unifu n c tio n s I, I t  has one proper use, 
and is ( id e a lly )  foo lp roo f. And a device stands ready fo r use, i t  is 
in s ta n tly  a v a ila b le , always in reserve.
At Marx's time the th ing-device d is tin c tio n  was much less c lea r  
than now. Yet Marx does make a d is tin c tio n  between the tool a worker 
d ire c ts , and the machine (to o l) which determines a worker. There is 
something to th is  fo r our purpose, because the machine determines the 
worker in that i t  is uni fu n c tio n a l, because i t  does assert one means fo r  
one end, and because i t  does stand ready fo r  use. This helps to ex­
p la in  what we mean when we speak of a person being 'turned in to  a machine'. 
Yet Marx does not see th a t th is  trend to  machines, or towards devices, 
reduces the world of the worker. Rather he sees i t  as opening p o s s ib il it ie s
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fo r community, Marx Is taken by the aspects o f technology which he fee ls  
are freeing o f the worker. T h is , again , has reference to  Marx's con­
ception of labor and le is u re .
The fetishism  o f commodities has fo r Marx Its  o rig in  In the social 
character o f producing labor. In c a p ita lis m .^  What obtains in th is  
fetish ism  are m ateria l re la tio n s  between persons and social re la tio n s  
between t h i n g s . T h e r e  are several points to be noted. F i r s t ,  In 
cap ita lism  men are reduced to the level o f things (commodities, labor- 
power), and although Marx does not exp lica te  what the re la tio n s h ip  be­
tween men Is Id e a lly ,  we are Inc lined  to  accept th a t I t  should not be 
(exc lu s ive ly ) th a t as between th ings. Secondly, we find  commodities 
raised to the level o f men. In that they take on a social character, 
appear as Independent beings, become nearly  metaphysical e n t it le s  In 
the soc iety . We say 'n early  m etaphysical' because a conmodlty Is ,  
s t r ic t ly  speaking, not a thing fo r Marx, but an economic e n t i ty ,  one 
which takes on f e t ls h ls t ic  proportions In cap ita lism . That which be­
gins as a use-value, a th in g , becomes perverted In to  something other 
than physical. The social character o f men In cap ita lism  does not 
show I t s e l f  except In the exchange o f commodities.^^
Marx does not provide examples, and so we are le f t  to ponder 
exactly  what can be meant by the fetish ism  o f commodities. Let us con­
s ider b r ie f ly  the place o f the automobile In our soc iety . Cars have 
or can have a magical q u a lity ,  something m ystical about them. They do 
assert a power which Is not th e irs  from a consideration of mere form 
and physical m atter. These less prosaic elements are usually the ones 
emphasized In advertisements and commercials. This car w il l  make one 
f re e , that car w i l l  enhance one's m ascu lin ity , a th ird  w i l l  Increase the
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number o f one's fr ie n d s . Marx was In one sense qu ite  right--com m odities  
do often provide, o r are claimed as provid ing , a social context or re ­
la tionsh ip  or q u a lity ,  perhaps one's place w ith in  society . An automobile 
e ffe c ts  a d e f in it io n  o f one's character. In speaking of the sense o f 
d e fin it io n  which cars bestow upon one, we may re fe r to  a more or less 
s u p e rfic ia l d e fin in g . The c a r, however, is merely one o f dozens o f 
commodities, the c o lle c t iv e  e ffe c t o f which one is less l ik e ly  to  es­
cape.
Commodities are a t e l i c  force in cap ita lism  fo r Marx— they provide  
a necessary goal fo r  everyone in the so c ie ty . One must exchange to  
l iv e .  To an extent they provide the social re la tio n s  among men; to  what 
degree is a moot to p ic , but they indeed force a good deal of social in ­
tercourse to  take place w ith in  the context o f buying and s e l l i n g . ^ ?
Yet th is  is in d is tin c t . Commodities are mysterious because they 
provide ready-made values^® or goals, and a p refabricated  form in 
which men must in te ra c t. But i t  is not enough to  say th a t. In add ition  
the values which are inherent in commodities are frivo lo u s  values, be­
cause they are bought and sold. A ll things are reduced to  money, in 
that money can procure any commodity. Money is seen by Marx to  be the 
"absolute a lie n a b le  form o f a commodity".^® A ll commodities are a t our 
serv ice , are a v a ila b le  fo r  a p ric e . Hence the m oral, or l ife -v a lu e s  
th a t commodities represent are av a ila b le  fo r  a p ric e . We simply choose 
which value we might l ik e  and i t  is ours. However because i t  Is an 
easy choice, from among a v a rie ty  o f p o s s ib i l i t ie s ,  no one value asserts  
i t s e l f ,  and any value which we might choose is p la y fu lly  chosen, lacking  
in seriousness, and can be equally w ell thrown back.^O
Commodities are in some sense necessary fo r s u rv iva l; some form of
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exchange is necessary, except in the most hybrid (Robinson Crusoe) 
cases. 3ut i t  is not as 'su rv iva l insuring ' tha t we know commodities 
g en era lly . Survival does not provide a very useful c r ite r io n , in that 
i t  serves as a basis fo r most values. I t  Is rather as choice, as a l ­
te rn a tiv e ly  av a ila b le  items of existence that we know conned 11ie s .
Commodities function more as expressions o f s e l f - fu l f i l lm e n t  than 
as expressions o f necessity. C erta in ly  some nourishment Is needed 
fo r s u rv iv a l, and th is  physical need Is served by some commodity or 
another, but I t  Is not in these terms that we usually in te ra c t w ith  
them. Rather we buy something In a p re tty  package, or something on 
s a le , or something to  increase sex appeal. This s e l f - fu l f i l lm e n t  Is 
characterized by a huge area of a lte rn a tiv e s  (w ith in  which d is t in c ­
tions are often m inute). And any s e l f - fu l f i l lm e n t  w i l l  be a rb itra ry ,  
or g ra tu ito u s , in the context o f other possible a lte rn a tiv e s .
In summation, we fin d  that Marx's view o f commodities and the 
fetish ism  of commodities is inadequate, but suggestive. Marx's po­
s it io n  Is that an a r t ic le  of u t i l i t y  becomes a commodity because i t  
is produced fo r exchange-value rather than use-value. We understand 
commodities to  be technological products, to  be devices, and th is  
subsumes Marx's notion w ith in  i t .  The e f fe c t  o f devices is to be 
generally  reductive of a person's world.
For Marx, commodity fetish ism  Is e s s e n tia lly  an inverted re la t io n ­
ship between men and things. We, on the o ther hand, see commodity 
fe tish ism  to be a c r is is  in values, the c r is is  o f choosing from among 
equally  ambiguous, equally  a v a ila b le , and in the end, equally unworthy 
vaIues .52
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FOOTNOTES
^We shall make use o f a d is tin c tio n  between the mode of production and 
the process o f production, the former designating a p a rt ic u la r  socio­
economic order ( e .g . ,  cap ita lism  or feudalism) and the la t t e r  desig­
nating a soclo-technological order ( e .g . .  Manufacture or In d u stry ).
The d is tin c tio n  is not always help fu l or c le a r , and in examining a 
social trend I t  is sometimes d i f f i c u l t  to  t e l l  what Is the e f fe c t  o f 
which. Marx im p lic it ly  accepts such a d is tin c tio n .
^Karl Marx, C a p ita l. A C ritiq u e  o f P o lit ic a l  Economy, ed. Frederick  
Engels, t ra n s . , Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (In te rn a tio n a l Pub­
lis h e rs , New York, N .Y ., 1967), p. 43.
3 |b id . , p. 39. Such necessity (in  " labour-tim e s o c ia lly  necessary") 
presupposes a liv in g  standard which holds firm .
4 |b id . ,  p. 40.
5 lb id .
6 |b id .
7 |b ld . ,  p. 152-153- 'The restless never-ending process o f pro fit-m aking  
alone Is what he the c a p ita l is t  aims a t ."
* lb id . .  p. 371.
9 |b id . ,  p. 382.
10|b id .
Ib id . . p .  383.
^^Ib id . See also p. 386.
13|b id . .  p. 384.
l 4 |b id . , p. 386, pp. 380 - 381 . Cf. also Karl Marx, Grundrisse. Foundations 
of the C ritiq u e  o f P o lit ic a l Economy, t ra n s ., w ith foreword, by Martin  
Nicolaus (v in tage Books, New York, N .Y ., 1973). P- 700.
l^ Capi ta  I , p. 381 .
1^Grundrisse, p. 703-
17|b id . ,  p. 705 . (Emphasis added)
iQç a p ita l , pp. 371- 372 .
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Ib id . . p. 373- Note here a tendency fo r the d irec tio n  or ordering of 
the process to move one step up, perhaps towards a 'technocracy'.
20 |b ld . .  p. 374.
Ib id .
22see above fo r a discussion of the th ing-devlce d is t in c tio n . Also see 
M artin Heidegger, "Die Frage nach der Technik", In Die Technik und 
Die Kehre (Neske. P fu llln g en , 1962) fo r fu rth e r discussion.
ZSç a p Ita l . p. 394.
^**lb ld . , p. 397 e t passim.
2 5 |b ld . .  p. 399.
2 * lb ld . . p. 403.
2 7 |b ld . . p. 430.
Ib id . . p. 443, fo r the factors Involved In employment.
^^See footnote 32 below.
^^Thls Is A lbert Borgmann's d is tin c tio n .
3^C a p ita l. p. 4 4 l.  Grundrisse, p. 705-06. Marx would appear to  accept 
a d iv is io n  (perhaps remlntscent o f 19th Century evo lutionary theory) 
between that time which we must work. In order to  surv ive , and the 
le is u re  time we have (a f te r  surv iva l Is Insured), during which we 
develop ourselves, fin d  real s e l f - fu l f i l lm e n t .  This Is unacceptable, 
as I t  re lie s  upon a d iv is io n  w ith in  the l i f e  o f a person, between the 
necessary work, which Is bad fo r  the person, and the le isu re  a c t iv i t ie s ,  
which are made frivo lous  In that they are epI phenomena I upon the 
re a lly  basic function ( I . e . ,  labor) In l i f e .
3^See above, p. 4-5.
33çrundrlsse, pp. 704-05; C a p ita l. pp. 389-90.
S^Grundrlsse, pp. 703-04.
^ ^ h e re  would seem to be a d ia le c t ic  o f science creating  technology 
(m ateria l surplus, le isu re ) which then leads to fu rth e r advancements 
In science.
36 Grundrisse, p . 705•
^^C a p lta l, p. 386 .
38 |b ld .
I b I d . , p . 380 .
40 |b ld . , p. 80.
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See Ludwig Landgrebe, Major Problems In Contemporary European Philosophy. 
From Pi I they to Heidegger, trans. Kurt F. Reinhardt (Frederick Ungar 
Publishing Co., New York, NY, 1966), p. 162.
^^Capi t a l , p. 80.
43
The 'th in g -d ev ice ' d is tin c tio n  is A lbert Borgmann's.
^ Capi t a l , p. 72.
' ib id .
4 6 | b i d .
^ S |b i .. p. 72-73.
^^This is perhaps less true o f modern day America than o f European countries
^®Here, "values" is used in a sense wider than "economic va lue". So, too, 
h e re a fte r.
4 9 |b id .
5 0 |t  is in te re s tin g  to note, however, that the values chosen are o ften  
p a ra s it ic  on 'th in g s ',  on tra d it io n a l values. Per achtw hnte Brumal re 
des Louis Bonaparte, Karl Marx, F ried rich  EngelTT& rke band 8 (D ie tz  
Verlag , B e rlin , I9 6 0 ) , pp. 153-154. "Das parlam entarlsche Regime leb t  
von der Diskussion, wie so il es die Olskussion verbleten? Jedes In ­
teresse, jede gesel1sch aftlich e  Einrichtung w ird h ie r  in allgemeine 
Gedanken verwandelt, a ls  Gedank^n verhandelt, wie so il i rgendein In ­
téresse, e lne E inrichtung sich uber dem Denken behaupten und a ls  Glaubens- 
a r t ik e l imponieren?"
This paragraph intim ates the structure  o f the modern lib e ra l s ta te , a 
s ta te  whose function is that o f  m ediator, w ith  no p a r t ic u la r  in te re s t,  
which nurtures the r e la t iv i ty  o f a l l  In te re s ts . Thus a l l  positions  
are reduced to " in te re s ts " , to ideologies.
Marx's more e x p lic i t  analysis is undercut by th is  view; in the 20th 
century there is a new class o f people, who have 'no' class in te re s ts , 
but rather serve to mediate class In te re s ts , or to serve whichever in ­
te res t is predominant.
I f  society is understood to be composed o f re la t iv e  in te re s ts , and the 
sta te  to be that which serves predominant in te re s ts , (but not tied  to 
any p a rt ic u la r  in te re s t) ,  th is  leads to a constant s ta te  o f reconstruc­
tio n , to a continual cu ltu ra l re la tiv is m .
Technology (understood as the best means to a v a r ie ty  o f ends) then be­
comes the in te re s t o f  every group in a s ta te , since i t  is the servant 
o f any group's in te re s ts . Moreover, nothing in the s ta te  is by n atu re .
For Marx i t  was re la t iv e ly  important where one stood in so c ie ty , whereas 
here one's in te res ts  are unimportant. Marx's analysis assumes a con­
nection between your class In te res ts  and the sort o f person you a re , your 
character.
The preceding analysis I owe to Timothy F u lle r .
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52| do not here assert any so lution  to th is  c r is is ,  although i t  may seem 
that I imply a reduction in commodities, or lu xu ries , or a return  to 
values o f the past to be such a s o lu tio n . I do not see that th a t would 
be adequate, even I f  appropriate .
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PART I I
THE DIMINISHMENT OF THE SELF IN  LABOR
Th# purpose o f th is  paper Is to  provide a th eo re tica l grounding 
fo r the examination of labor In our so c ie ty . The paper Is funded by 
the notion th a t there Is a p o s itiv e  and a negative conception o f what 
we do In our lives  fo r a live lih o o d  ( I . e .  work or la b o r), and th a t the 
f i r s t  f u l f i l l s  or enlarges the s e l f ,  w h ile  the second Is a d im inish­
ment o f the s e lf .  I w il l  show also  the In tim ate connections between
th is  diminishment o f the s e lf  and what I c a ll technology, as manifes­
ted In labor today.
Ve w l!1 f i r s t  sketch generally  a notion o f the s e lf  which arises  
from Kant and then develop the d is tin c tio n  between work and lab o r, and 
our notion o f technology. F in a lly ,  we w il l  by way o f Merleau-Ponty 
Illu m in a te  more s p e c if ic a lly  our p a r t ic u la r  notion o f the s e l f ,  the re­
la tio n sh ip  o f s e lf  and body, and then develop some o f the Im plications  
fo r  labor.
We ground our analysis o f the diminishment of the s e lf  In labor 
through Kant. I t  Is Kant's analysis o f the s e lf  which w il l  serve as the 
basis fo r our discussion. The C ritiq u e  o f Pure Reason  ̂ o ffe rs  several 
perspectives o f the s e l f ,  some of which may be viewed as competing. In 
th is  paper I w i l l  emphasize the connection o f the s e lf  and the world for 
Kant, and fo r ourselves. This p o s itiv e  In te rp re ta tio n  Is derived mainly 
from the passage near the end o f Chapter I I  of the "A nalytic  o f P rin ­
c ip le s " . e n t it le d  "Refutation o f Idealism ". This passage is am plified
by M artin Heidegger In section 42 (a) of Being and Tlme.^ I t  is by way 
of Heidegger that we understand our p o s itiv e  In te rp re ta tio n . Kant's 
thesis Is th a t "The mere, but e m p ir ic a lly  determined, consciousness of
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2
my own existence proves the existence o f objects in space outside of 
m e " . 3 What we d i s t i l l  from th is  is th a t fo r Kant, and fo r  us, the un ity  
of the s e lf  and the un ity  of the world are in some sense tie d  up w ith  
each o th er. N a ive ly , they are the same u n ity .
We must o ffs e t th is  p o s itiv e  in te rp re ta tio n  by touching on what 
may be considered the rad ical unworldliness o f the s e lf ;  th is  is the 
Kantian sense o f the s e lf  revealed mainly in the "Paralogisms". He 
s ta te s .
That the ' I ' ,  the ' I '  that th in k s , can be regarded always as 
subJect, and as something which does not belong to thought as 
a mere p red ica te , must be granted. I t  is an apodeictic  and 
indeed Id en tic a l proposition; but i t  does not mean th a t I ,  as 
o b je c t, am fo r  myself a s e lf-s u b s ls te n t being or substance.
in the "Antinomy" we find  Kant, perhaps unsuccessfully, try in g  to  pull 
together the w orld liness and the unworldliness of the s e lf  by showing 
i t  to  be the o rig in  o f the cau sa lity  of freedom. Thus what we have fo r  
Kant are two sides to the s e l f ,  which may or may not end up on the same 
coin fo r him. In the f i r s t  case there Is l i t t l e  problem o f discovering  
the s e lf ;  i t  is everywhere, in fa c t . In g rea te r and lesser degrees, as 
we experience and act in the w orld , as we d ire c t ourselves outward. As 
Kant says, " in  order to so determine i t  [th e  s u b je c t] , outer objects are 
q u ite  indispensable; and i t  th erefo re  follows that inner experience is 
i t s e l f  possible only m ediately , and only through outer e x p e r ie n c e .T h e  
s e lf  is the frame or subject to  experience, as that in which or by which 
we experience.^ In the second case we can never find  the s e lf  in looking 
fo r  I t ,  i t  is system atically  e lus ive  ( in  Ryle's words), i t  Is pure sub­
je c t ,  i t  is not a th in g , and i t  is unexperienceable. Kant also makes a 
d is tin c tio n  between the in te l l ig ib le  and em pirical s e l f ,  f i r s t  in the 
"Transcendental Deduction" (where he also emphasizes the un ity  o f the 
s e lf  as a p rerequ is ite  to apperception)^ and in the "Antinomy".®
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This paper deals w ith  Kant's se t* as in the w orld, the e n o ir ic a lly  
determined existence o f man in the w orld. The negative s e lf  (the e lu ­
s iv e , n on -th in g like  s e lf )  is used to exorcise c e rta in  prevalent concep­
tions which attempt to determine the s e lf  as a th in g , As we shall see, 
labor necessitates the s e lf  being thought o f as a th in g , even attempts 
to  turn the s e lf  In to  a th ing. The conception I want to  enlarge upon, 
the p o s itiv e  conception o f the s e lf  w ith  the w orld , the s e lf  embodied 
and 'bew orlded ', Is the s e lf  in action . Our analysis understands the 
s e lf  as in the w orld , and illu m in a ted , as i t  were, by the w o rld , and 
yet not as a th in g , or an o b jec t. The s e lf  is from one perspective in ­
t e l l ig ib le  and from another em p irica l. But in e ith e r  case we must heed
the lessons o f the "Paralogisms" and not try  to  turn the s e lf  in to  an 
o b jec t. The p o s itiv e  sense o f the s e l f ,  is the s e lf  we come w ith , as we 
come w ith  a world; i t  is the un ity  o f the s e lf  and the world which must 
be considered in order to  a rr iv e  at the parts o f the whole given to us.
'The body is the mediate subject o f experience, but not the u ltim ate  
sub ject, not the true ' I ' . '  As soon as th is  is w r it te n , doubts a r is e .
How is the body d if fe re n t  from the ' I ' ?  There are perhaps a c tiv e  bodies 
o f human shape, which nonetheless may be diagnosed as lacking an ' I ' — 
bodies in d e liriu m , fo r example. Kant may, in his emphasis upon the
negative aspects o f the s e l f ,  give away the body as not being o f u ltim ate
s ign ificance fo r the s e lf .  We want, ra th e r, to a ffirm  the embodied as­
pects of selfhood, esp ec ia lly  in re la tio n  to our emphasis upon the con­
nection of s e lf  and world. We w i l l ,  th e re fo re , ta c i t ly  accept th a t the 
body and s e lf  are one. The body is not simply the subject fo r or o f the 
' I ' ,  but as w ell i t  is the expression o f the ' ! ' ,  and is necessary not 
only fo r the representation of outer o b jec ts , but fo r the actions of the 
'1 ' in the world. The body carries  fo rth  the meaning or freedom of the
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' I ' in to  the world.
I fo llow  Jacques E llu l^  (although he Is not a lto gether consistent 
in his usage) In making a d is tin c tio n  between work and labor. Work is 
a much older term In our language and one which bears a great many more 
meanings; labor Is newer and more narrowly defined. Here t sha ll use
work to  denote the tra d it io n a l and pretechnolog leal actions o f men, those
by which they not only sustained themselves in the world (a minimal l iv e ­
lih o o d ), but by which they were defined and enriched. I use work as a 
paradigm by which to  measure and characterize  the aspects o f labor. Not 
anything pretechnologleal is work; laboring on the edge o f physical sur­
v iva l would v io la te  ce rta in  c h a ra c te ris tic s  o f work, as would laboring  
as a s lave. By labor I denote the modern and technological phenomenon,
th a t o f earning a l iv ig  at a Job.
What is labor? That is ,  what is the technological form o* work?
We must presuppose a th eo re tic a l grasp o f technology; to e lu c id a te  such 
a grasp would involve a much longer essay. We must presume an In tu it iv e  
comprehension o f technology. We lay emphasis here upon a p a r t ic u la r  sort 
of technology, the most detrim ental k ind , which is perhaps both tyrann ica l 
and noxious. The sort o f labor which we re fe r  to  is then b ru ta l and ex­
p lo it in g . This kind o f technology and th is  kind of labor are not the 
only kinds today. Technology is ,  as often  as n o t, seductive, and has 
c le a r ly  p o s itiv e  aspects. The paradigm o f technology today may more pro­
perly  be the prevalent consumerism o f in d u s tria l s o c ie tie s . These two 
kinds o f technology, the tyrann ical and the seductive , are aspects o f one 
fo rce . We w il l  simply s ta te  th a t technology is a pervasive phenomenon, 
one reaching to  the very roots; a ffe c tin g  the very fa b ric  o f society and 
6 f  r e a l i ty .  inadequately, but concrete ly , we may id e n tify  w ith  the 
machine. Again, inadequately, and th e o re t ic a lly ,  we may id e n tify  technology
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5
w ith  ' e f f i c i e n c y ' . T h e s e  are merely slogans, however, and i t  is per­
haps b e tte r  to  simply le t  our examination o f labor point towards the 
im p lic it  understanding o f technology as m anifest in labor.
How is labor d iffe re n t  from work? How is the laborer d iffe re n t  
from the worker? And how is the product o f labor d iffe re n t  from the 
object o f work? We must begin by saying that what we are dealing w ith  
is a systematic and interconnected whole. The product o f labor cannot 
be separated from the method o f labor (the  process) and n e ith e r can be 
separated from the laborer. I t  should not be forgotten th a t as we 
analyze d isparate elements of labor we do not have to w ait upon any
th e o re tic a l synthesization o f them; there already ex is ts  a syn thetic  de
fac to  un ity  which has man as its  o b j e c t . T h u s  we may analyze in to  
separate elements fo r h e u ris tic  purposes, but should keep In mind that 
we so r is k  losing that by which the phenomena gain meaning.
Technological labor throws man back in to  him self (In  a p e jo ra tiv e
sense). The noise o f the factory  work is pervasive and anonymous.
There is a lack o f even basic communication among laborers. There is a
lack o f confrontation or involvement w ith  the m ateria ls  which make up
12the product, knowledge of m ateria ls  becomes scarcer. There is a lack 
of care or concern fo r the product i t s e l f .  Thus, the q u a lit ie s  ca lled  
fo r in man by labor d i f f e r  ra d ic a lly  from those ca lled  fo r by work. As
E llu l s ta te s , labor c a lls  fo r an absence, ra ther than a presence, an
a c tiv e , c r i t i c a l ,  and e f f ic ie n t  absence. Man is subordinated to the 
necessities o f labor, and made fo r its  ends.^^ The meeting o f man w ith  
the w orld , w ith  previously basic elements of the w orld , is reduced to  
l i t t l e .  Labor is unidimensional In th a t the man confronts a machine 
(instead of the m ateria ls  he once worked w ith ) in an endlessly repeated, 
precisely  defined and d ic ta ted  manner. E llu l w r ite s .
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Man as worker has lost contact w ith  the primary element o f l i f e  
and environment, the basic m ateria l out o f which he makes. He 
no longer knows wood or Iron or wool. He Is acquainted only  
w ith  the machine. His capacity to  become a mechanic has replaced  
his knowledge o f m a teria ls ; th is  development has occasioned pro­
found mental and psychic transform ations which cannot yet be 
assessed."
The worker becomes a machine, performs the function o f a machine, a t the 
ra te  and In the manner o f a m a c h i n e . L a b o r  demands that the laborer 
be fu n c tio n a l, e f f ic ie n t ,  and In tensely unlnvolved. The labor demands 
very l i t t l e  o f his reasoning fa c u lt ie s — only that they be dormant. The 
deeper c a p a b ilit ie s  o f the man are not c a lle d  in to  play.1& The mind o f  
the laborer Is not Involved w ith  the lab o r, except In a minimal way; the 
a c t iv i ty  is hab itual and does not demand the use o f any higher fa c u lty .  
As Friedmann says, "The deeper levels  o f perso nality  find  no o u tle t  in 
th e ir  *#ork, which has become something q u ite  foreign to them, so that 
In re la tio n  to  i t  they are 'a l ie n a te d '." *^  The worker becomes deperson­
a liz e d , becomes an 'in terchangeable u n i t ' .  The labor causes a s tra in  
on the a tte n tio n  o f the laborer; the nervous exhaustion o f so many con­
stant hab itual motions is considerable, growing, perhaps, as the t r a ­
d it io n a l muscular fa tig u e  has been l e s s e n e d . E l l u l ,  furtherm ore, ex­
p lic a te s  what we may c a ll the exhaustion o f the w i l l ,  which takes place 
in technological labor, a psychic extension of nervous fa tig u e .
We may ask, in order to  fu rth e r i l lu s t r a te  our discussion of the s e lf  
in labor, how the pretechnological object of work is d iffe re n t  from the 
product of technological labor. This may be divided into three m utually  
dependent categories: a) that which is created , b) the reasons fo r its
c rea tio n , and c) method o f c re a tio n . One v ir tu e  of labor is th a t i t  pro­
duces a b e tte r  q u a lity  product than was previously made, as w ell as pro­
v id ing more o f then. Technology can provide a b e tte r q u a lity  o f s u i t ,  
fo r  example; that is , one that is longer las tin g  and b e tte r  looking, and
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so on, although th is  is not always what in fa c t happens. Th is , i t  can be 
re p lie d , is merely bad technology, and once everyth ing is tuned to the 
proper p itch  in technological labor we are q u ite  capable o f  producing more 
and b e tte r  su its  than were possible w ith  work. At the same tim e, however, 
the labor lowers the q u a lity  o f human being. At one time the man made 
s u its , because he was a t a i lo r ,  because someone he knew needed the s u it .
Now the man runs fa b ric  through a machine, o r s titch e s  along precut lin e s ,  
because he must l iv e  on the wages he earns. He is reduced to turning out 
numbers, not s u its . Labor has become a mere means fo r  him, whereas work 
was both a means and an end. He does not d ire c t  h is  own a c t iv i t ie s ,  and 
he does not know fo r whom the su its  are produced. As the worker becomes 
q u a n tif ie d , or o b je c t if ie d , o r turned in to  a unidimensional functio n , he 
is  reduced to the same level as the other parts o f  the machine which pro­
duces s u its . He is reduced to a th in g .*0  This appears to be a manifes­
ta tio n  o f  technology gen era lly . E llu l w rite s .
Once again [in  vocational guidance] we are confronted w ith  a mechanism 
o f adaptation which deprives man o f freedom and re s p o n s ib ility , makes 
him In to  a 'th in g ' and puts him where he is most des irab le  from the 
point o f view o f another technique, that is ,  where he is most e f f i c i e n t . "21
When viewed against the onto logical reduction o f man the q u a lity  o f the
s u it  becomes o f less and less concern, re la t iv e  to i ts  previous q u a lity .
The o r ig in a l q u a lita tiv e  scale involved with the s u it  (the choice o f the
man as to what sui t to make and how to make i t a good sui t )  has been ob-
I ite ra te d , or reduced to a 'problem' o f q u a lity .^ ^  The problems o f ends,
as El lu l  s ta tes ,
becomes that o f analyzing ind iv idual and social requirements te c h n ic a lly , 
o f e s tab lish in g , num ericaliy and m echanically, the constancy o f human 
needs
The 'problems' which a rise  in technology, then, are to be solved te c h n ic a lly , 
the ends which must be set must above a l l  be o b je c tiv e ly  s e t. "Technical
o| |
m odalities cannot to le ra te  s u b je c t iv ity ,"  E l lu l  says.
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The laborer Is system atica lly  a lien a ted  from the product o f  his  
labor. He has no choice o f  what to make or how to make i t .  There 
ex is ts  a screen o f implements and machines between man and the world 
he once knew, a gap is caused between the ind iv idual and re a lity .^ S  
Everything he produces is s im ila r  to every o ther th in g , and he only con­
trib u tes  a small part to the fin ished  product; thus his labor is never 
brought to f r u it io n ,  he never associates h im self w ith  a fin ished  thing  
thought o f in terms o f  its  use in the w orld. F in a lly , the man is a l ie n ­
ated in labor in another, more im portant, sense. That is ,  he e x is ts  in 
a s e rv ile  re la tio n s h ip  to the product and the production; he does not so 
much form, in labor, as he is formed. Notice that the a lie n a tio n  in labor 
to which I re fe r  is not the same as that a lie n a tio n  spoken o f  in  standard 
Marxian an a lys is . The a lie n a tio n  in labor o f which I speak takes place 
in both c a p ita l is t  and communist countries. Marx, h im se lf, was qu ite
26in s ig h tfu l in seeing the w ider so rt o f  a lie n a tio n  which I wish to assert 
The standard Marxian view sees a lie n a tio n  as a re la tio n s h ip  between the 
man and the product o f  labor which is used against him. The view o f  
a lie n a tio n  we are here asserting  is one o f 'onto log ica l a l ie n a t io n ',  in 
which the man in h is labor is reduced to the level o f thinghood.
Simply s ta ted , our thesis is th is :  in labor the man is no longer
governed in his a c t iv ity  only by h is  own consciousness and the requirements 
o f the m aterial (as he once was in  w o rk ), which he had to form to su i t  
him self and his customer, in lab o r, ra th e r, the man is now governed in  
his a c t i v i t y  by a foreign consciousness and by the o b jec tive  ( ' non-nego- 
t ia b le ')  requirements o f the machine. He does not deal wi th the m a te ria i, 
he must conform to a r ig id  regime o f a l imi ted a c t i v i t y  (both physical and 
mental) imposed by the machine. In p ractice  we may view these two con­
ceptions (o f work and labor) as the opposite poles o f a continuum. The
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question appears to be one o f the p r io r ity  o f  ends. in the c rea tive
process o f work or labor we ask: Who is in control o f  the ac t iv i ty?  In
the case o f work, i t  was c le a r ly  the nwn, whereas in  the case o f labor, 
i t  is c le a r ly  not the man. In labor the a c t iv i t y ,  the to ta l process, is
imposed upon the man, he is d irec ted , he is formed.
How is i t  that the s e l f  can be diminished? The s e lf  Is diminished  
insofar as the r e a l ity  created o r sustained by the s e l f  in In te ra c tio n  with 
the world is enlarged or dim inished. We are examining a microcosm o f th is  
re la tio n s h ip , th a t is , the s e lf  In in te ra c tio n  w ith the world in labor.
The re la tio n s h ip  o f s e lf  and labor is pinpointed here as th a t o f the body 
in labor. In what way are the meanings o f the physical a c t i v i t y  o f  the 
body in labor a reduction o f the meanings o f  the body a t work? P rim arily  
we view th is  reduction as one o f a manifold o f  movement, circumscribed 
only by the requirements o f the worker and the m a te r ia l, to the uni dimen­
s io n a lity  o f a functio n , circumscribed by the requirements o f e ff ic ie n c y  
o f m achine-like movements and the rates o f  production attuned to a machine.
White we may a l l  have some sense, today, o f what labor on a production 
l ine  is l i k e ,  i t  is d i f f i c u l t  to get a sense o f what work would be, or 
what i t  would mean. We might imagine a blacksmith as one paradigm o f the 
worker. He is placed, f i r s t  of  a l l ,  w i th in  the context o f h is l i f e  in a 
v illa g e  or town which is fa m ilia r  to him and wi th him. He makes things
fo r people whom he perhaps knows, who have come to him for a p a r t ic u la r
th ing , say a horseshoe, which w i l l  have a d e f in ite  place in the context.
In the production o f th is horseshoe the blacksmith has his context in c i r ­
cumspection before him— he knows the horse he w i l l  f i t ,  i ts  c h a ra c te r is tic s , 
what place i t  has on the farm o f its  owner. Moreover, he is aware o f his
equipment, that which he uses in making the horseshoe. He knows not only
the place o f his to o ls , where he got them, what they can and cannot do, how
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they f i t  into one another, but he also knows the wood he stokes his forge 
w ith , where i t  was cut, why i t  is best fo r his purpose, how long i t  w i l l  
burn and how hot. He knows where the sand he cools the hot metal in came 
from, the r iv e r  bank, what is upriver and down, perhaps the source o f  the 
r iv e r  in the d is tan t mountains, and what the r iv e r  is l ik e  when i t  floods 
with the spring runoff. Placed in a l l  o f  th is we can see that his work 
has much meaning fo r  him, and w ith in  i t  a i l ,  how what is important and 
valuable to him might have arisen .
We can say, as w e l l ,  that what the worker does stems to a much greater
degree from the in teraction  o f  s e l f  and world (he sets his own pace, e -
volves his own motions) than that which the laborer does. The laborer
must submit himself (his body) to a highly structured formula o f  a c t iv i t y .
As Marx w rites  in the Grundrisse.
Not as with the instrument, which the worker animates and makes 
into h is  organ with his s k i l l  and strength, and whose handling 
therefore depends upon his v i r tu o s ity .  Rather i t  is the machine 
which possesses s k i l l  and strength in place o f the worker, is i t ­
s e l f  the v irtuoso , with a soul o f  i t s  own in the mechanical laws
acting through i t  . . '
The problem with labor is not merely that i t  is an a c t i v i t y  which must 
be imposed upon the laborer . What the labor demands o f  the laborer is 
that he o b je c t i fy  his body (h im s e lf ) ,  that he become machine-like, a too l,  
an instrument, a means. "He s e l ls  h im se lf,"  Marx w rite s ,  "as an e f fe c t .
He is absorbed into the body o f  cap ita l as a cause, as a c t iv i t y ." ^ ^  The
a c t iv i t y  (meaning now 'physical movement') o f  a laborer is reduced to a 
single in ten tion , an imposed intention with a s ingle meaning. ( E l lu l :
"The technical problem is to make h is  gestures so automatic that they have 
no personal q u a li ty  a t  a l l  ")^^ The body is treated as machine, one which 
can be engaged and disengaged a t  pleasure, the actions o f  which have no 
consequences to the in te l le c t .  Labor drives a wedge between the mind and 
body. As E llu l  states:
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But to c a l l  good that fac t  that the worker thinks and dreams 
about matters unrelated to his work while his body carries  out 
certa in  mechanical a c t iv i t i e s  is to sanction the psychological 
dissociation between in te ll ig e n ce  and action which our technical 
society tends to produce and which is possibly the greatest o f  
human scourges. We thereby admit th a t ,  when a l l  is said and done, 
the ideal s ta te ,  higher than consciousness, is a dreaming s ta te .
In th is  sense the mind is considered as severed from the body, and one is
not only cut o f f  from thinking in app lica tion  to ac tion , but one is cut
o f f  from the v a r ie ty  o f  meanings which were previously inherent in any
c r a f t  or s k i l l ,  from thinking in the sense o f  dealing with a manifold
o f  r e a l i t y .
Maurice Merleau-Ponty shows that the body is a subject both fo r  and 
toward a world o f  things; the body is o r ien ta ted  (naively) in regard to 
things. This Merleau-Ponty sees not as the o r ie n ta t io n  o f  Euclid ian  
geometry, but rather as the basis fo r  such in te l l ig b le  o r ie n ta t io n .  Mer­
leau-Ponty w r ite s ,  "The tru th  is that homogeneous space can convey the 
meaning o f  o r ien ta ted  space only because i t  is from the l a t t e r  that i t  
has received that m e a n in g .M o v e m e n ts  reduced to th e ir  pathological 
deriva tives  are concrete movements o f  in te n tio n , movements o f  grasping, 
t e l i c  movements. " In  the last ana lys is ,"  Merleau-Ponty w r ite s ,
i f  my body can be a 'form' and I f  there can be. In fron t o f  i t ,  
important figures against in d if fe re n t  backgrounds, th is  occurs 
In v ir tu e  o f i ts  being polarized by i ts  tasks, o f i ts  existence  
towards them, o f i ts  co llec t in g  together of i t s e l f  in i ts  pursuit 
o f i ts  aims; the body Image is f in a l l y  a way of s ta ting  tha t my 
body is in the w o r l d .
This is another way of saying that the body image is dynamic, that the
s p e c ia l i ty  of my body is a s p e c ia l i ty  of s i tu â t  io n .33 For Merleau-Ponty
objective  time and space are b u i l t  out of bod ily  time and space. I t
would seem c lear  that th is  is true , at least In temporal p r io r i t y .  I
am subject, and : 'o b je c t i fy '  to a r r iv e  at the concepts of Euclidian
geometry. But can we then assume, as Merleau-Ponty does, that there is
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an ontological p r io r i t y ,  a p r io r i ty  in p r in c ip le ,  o f  bodily time and 
space over ob jec tive  time and space? Merleau-Ponty admits that the 
ob jective  o r ie n ta t io n  is necessary, i f  not s u f f ic ie n t  for the bodily  
o r ie n tâ t  io n .35 But he wants to establish  the primacy of bodily o r ie n ­
ta t io n .  What reasons might one give fo r th is  primacy? Im p l ic i t ly  
Merleau-Ponty o ffe rs  us the evidence o f cases o f pathological behavior. 
Those patients affected are seemingly reduced to only concrete behavior, 
and there appears to be a q u a l i ta t iv e  leap which they cannot make, be­
tween concrete and ob jective  movements. E x p l ic i t ly  we are offe red  the 
evidence that meaning must grow out of the bodily o r ien ta tio n  and s i tu ­
a t io n ,  and extend i t s e l f  to the o b jec t ive .
The cases o f  pathological patients which Merleau-Ponty presents to  
us are ambiguous and inconclusive fo r the very point he wishes to make.
One would expect the patients to lose th e ir  substantive (concrete) 
o r ie n ta t io n ,  since th is  is what Merleau-Ponty sees as more basic and im­
portant. Rather they lose the ob jective  (abstract) o r ie n ta t io n . I t  
w i l l  be more useful fo r us to understand the patient as one whose f ie ld  
of concern, whose context, has been diminished, and who consequently 
cannot deal w ith  merely formal space, but who is rather reduced to l iv in g  
w ith in  a very simple, substantive context.
Merleau-Ponty's radical claim cannot stand. Objective o r ie n ta t io n  
does not grow out of subjective o r ie n ta t io n ,  but rather n e ith er  has primacy 
over the other. Merleau-Ponty himself admits that whenever we look to 
bodily o r ien ta tio n  we must f a l l  back into an explanation in terms of  
objective  o r ien tâ t  io n .3* Temporally, subjective space may be p r io r ,  
but th is  says nothing concerning primacy; one might say with equal r igh t  
that ob jective  space is the more fundamental, since i t  is more complex or 
is of a higher order. Merieau-Ponty sees ob jective  space as 'o u te r ' and
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'impoverished' and subjective space as ' in n e r '  and ' r i c h ' .  This is 
based on a s u b je c t iv is t ic  dualism, one which u lt im ate ly  finds meaning 
only in the intentioning s e lf .^ ^  He w r i te s ,  "The d is t in c t io n  between 
concrete and abstract movement [which leads to the sub jec tive -ob jec t ive  
d is t in c t io n ] ,  between Grelfen and Zeigen comes down to tha t between the 
physiological and the psychic, existence in i t s e l f  and existence for  
i t s e l f . "3*
i f ,  indeed, labor c u lt iva tes  in man a depleted o r ie n ta t io n ,  i f  i t  
reduces him to a thing among th ings, why is th is  a negating o f his 
humanness? Why Is work preferable to labor as we have de lim ited  them? 
Merleau-Ponty would most c e r ta in ly  want to  assert the value of work In 
re la t io n  to labor, but his discussion of ob jec tive  and sub jective  space 
leaves us without a so lid  basis fo r  such an assertion .
Merleau-Ponty is surely r ight in seeing that there are two d i f fe r e n t  
types of space. Where he goes wrong Is ,  f i r s t  o f a l l ,  in c a l l in g  these 
two types ob jec tive  and sub jec tive , since th is  misleads us about th e ir  
true character. Secondly, he is wrong in a t t r ib u t in g  impoverishment 
(the outer) to one side of the d is t in c t io n  (ob jective ) and richness (the  
inner) to the other (su b jec t iv e ).  These are categories of what we shall 
ca ll  substantive space.
So that we may avoid the problems we have discovered in Merleau- 
Ponty ' s d is t in c t io n ,  we w i l l  replace his terms with those o f our own.
The ob jective  space we w i l l  c a l l  formal ( th a t  of means), the subjective  
space, substantive (ends). Thus, formal o r ien ta tio n  (geometry would be 
an example) allows many substantive o r ien ta tions  w ithin i t ;  the two spaces 
(formal and substantive) do not c o n f l ic t .  With Merleau-Ponty th is  could 
be otherwise. Only substantively can intentions compete; i t  is w ith in  
substantive o r ien ta tio n  that the laborer is reduced in meaning. We might
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
take a map as an example of formal space. A map can t e l l  one how to go, 
but i t  does not t e l l  one where to want to  go. There are many possible  
routes and destinations lying possible upon a map. But u n t i l  we bring  
some sort o f sense, some kind of intention to the map i t  t e i i s  us only
of the existence of a v a r ie ty  o f possible ob jectives .
Technology sometimes has the appearance o f a formal o r ie n ta t io n ,
i t  looks i Ik e  i t  Is a systematic analysis o f a s i tu a t io n  and an implemen­
ta t io n  o f  the best means possible fo r the solution to  the problems of  
that s i tu a t io n .  I t  may indeed re ly  upon science fo r  the analysis of a 
s itu a t io n ;  however, i t  Im p l ic i t ly  s l ip s  Into  a substantive o r ien ta t io n  
in any implementation of a so lu tion . I t  Is an Ind ication o f the sub­
s tan tiv e  nature o f technology that f t  leads to a dfmfnishment o f the 
s e l f .  A formal o r ien ta tion  always allows many possible in ten tions , even 
many possible worlds; technology, however, makes the demand that there 
is one best world, one best way to undertake something. To f u l l y  show 
technology as substantive would involve an e x p l ic i t  analysis of i ts  
po s it iv e  and negative factors; we cannot undertake th is  task here.
Why, then, is work more desirable than labor? F i r s t ,  work demands 
a manifold o f in tentions, a system o f ends, from the man in regard to the 
world. Labor constructs a unidimensionaiity o f ac tion , where a single  
end is given to ta l  p r io r i t y ,  and the world , in tu rn , cones to be defined 
by th is  s ingle end. Secondly, the (physical) object o f work gives and 
is given meaning in Interaction  w ith a manifold world , whereas the pro­
duct of labor retains only a diminutive meaning. The worker is formed 
in to  a unidimensionai re la tionsh ip  w ith i t ,  and is kept from any d ire c t  
re ia tlonsh io  to the m ate r ia i,  as machines become interposed. The laborer 
is no longer concerned with the object of labor and i t  faces into the 
distance fo r him. T h ird ly ,  in work a man f u l f i l l s  a manifold of
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in te n t io n a l i ty in the creation of a meaning between himself and the ob ject.  
In labor the man does not draw with any intention the meaning from the 
product, does not assign any end with the object in view, but rather the 
thing which he p a r t ly  forms drives back towards him, and as he lets him­
s e l f  be made a means, as he becomes a machine, he loses the intentioning  
aspect, the end-assigning re la tionsh ip  which worked to define him. In 
labor the world is sub stan tia l ly  less orientated  ^  him, he f a l l s  Into  
accepting the world 's o r ien ta tion  o f him. He no longer asserts himself 
as sub ject, but f a l l s  to  le t t in g  himself be delim ited as o b jec t .  He 
no longer a c t iv e ly  draws out meaning, but f a l l s  to l iv in g  out that meaning 
which Is Imposed on him. This is to say that the meaning o f  his labor 
Is always already decided—his task and i ts  manner o f  fu l f i l lm e n t  Is 
decided, his rate o f  production Is decided, and his function w ith in  the 
process as a whole is already decided.
Whereas Merleau-Ponty affirm s the notion of intention in o r ien ta tio n  
(as 's p e c ia l i ty  of s i t u a t io n ' ) ,  he does not yet go fa r  enough, so fa r  
as to draw out the q u a l i ta t iv e  d ifference between the intentions involved 
in work as opposed to those involved in labor. At best he can show a 
q u a n tita t ive  d ifference of the number o f  intentions concerned in each.
This is the case fo r  Merleau-Ponty because, as we have observed, he places 
in tentional I ty  (s£. value) in subjective o r ien ta tion  and opposes i t  to 
ob jective  o r ie n ta t io n ;  then when faced with a problem of value (deciding  
between in te rp re ta tions) on the 'sub jective  l e v e l ' ,  he has no help to 
o f fe r  us. This is to say he does not provide us w ith  a fo c a l ,  or va lu a t ive ,  
context from out o f  which we may Judge and act What we assert is that  
the reduction o f the manifold o f intentions to a s ingle in tention  in labor, 
which single intention is imposed upon the man as laborer, amounts to a 
q u a l i ta t iv e  d ifference between work and labor. Simply s ta ted , the
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q u a l i ta t iv e  d iffarance a f fe c ts  the very function o f  assigning and 
drawing fo rth  intentions i t s e l f .
The abstraction o f the body in labor leads to the a lie n a tio n  of the
s e l f  from the world—as we)I as a diminishraent and d isorien ta tion  of
both s e l f  and world. The s e l f  becomes e i th e r  absolutized into  something 
untouched by whatever the body must undertake, or i t  is p a r t ic u la r ize d  
in to  ju s t  another th ing , an o b jec t ,  and as such is ava ilab le  to  ob ject-  
l ik e  solutions to i ts  problems. As a man is forced to  conform to the
d ic ta tes  o f  technological labor the problems which arise  from the dimin-
ishment of the s e l f  and the world, o f  h is  r e a l i t y ,  are e i th e r  disregarded 
as being unavailable to treatment, or labeled as some th in g - l lk e  malaise  
and treated as such. As the body comes to  be conceived in o b je c t - l ik e  
terms i t  becomes something foreign to me, i t  becomes, in Marcel's term, 
"not-mine".39 This tendency is concretely exhibited in labor, as shown 
by the foregoing discussion.
What we posited concerning the s e l f ,  w ith in  a Kantian in te rp re ta ­
t io n ,  was that the unity  o f the s e l f  and the unity  o f  the world were 
t ie d  up together. I t  follows that as r e a l i t y ,  as the world. Is reduced 
to  a s ingle dimension in labor, the s e l f  which lives  and in teracts  with  
that r e a l i ty  is likewise diminished. The horizon o f  the world waxes 
and wanes, and correspondingly, the horizon o f the s e l f .
Kant, however, gives away the body, so to speak, to the sciences 
and the s e l f  is thereby relegated to the purely noumenal level (which 
is unavailable to the sciences). We have corrected th is  tendency by 
re ly ing upon Merleau-Ponty, who emphasizes the embodied aspects of 
selfhood, i t  is the integral whole of nlnd and body which labor d ivides.  
Merleau-Ponty, however, lacks a c r i te r io n  for showing a reduction of 
context leads to a reduction o f  s e l f ;  that is ,  he does not analyze or
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• x h ib i t  the paradigm s ituations and events o f being human which would 
then lend focus to a c r i t ic is m  o* d iminutive forms. We have recourse 
to our notion o f work, which provides the c r i t i c a l  focus lacking in 
Merleau-Ponty.
That which is found objectional in labor, that which diminishes the 
s e l f  of the laborer is as follows: F i r s t ,  in our paradigm example of
labor, an assembly l in e ,  we find that the laborer does only one th ing;  
he has, then, been reduced to a uni functional laboring existence, he has 
become mere means. Always and already his pro ject has been circumscribed 
fo r him, and so he has no part in a d ire c t iv e  p a r t ic ip a t io n ,  an in te n tio n ­
al i t y ,  insofar as his laboring goes. This leads f in a l l y  to a d iv is ion  
of mind and body, to a wedge being driven between the facts of his e x is ­
tence and the values which might have formed and sustained his existence,  
or to phrase i t  a l te rn a t iv e ,  to a dichotomy o f  means and ends in his l i f e .
Work, as we have used the concept here, is a c r i t i c a l  to o l ,  and not 
something to which we might return. Once we have a technological so lu t ion ,  
a means to some end, we cannotr simply deny i ts  e f f ic a c y  and attempt to 
carry on w ith the old methods, at least not without previously undertaking 
a reconsideration of the values Im p lic it  in a l te rn a t iv e  modes o f  produc­
t io n ,  and, perhaps, fee ling  a claim stronger than that which we find in 
technological progress.
There are mediate curatives to some of the problems addressed herein . 
These would involve greater and increasing p a r t ic ip a t io n  by the laborer in 
the design and fu l f i l lm e n t  of his task, undertaking larger and more mean­
ingful parts of production, and increasing involvement with the to ta l  sys­
tem of production, including the assignment of ends to be achieved. There 
would have to be a concrete analysis of the in te rp lay  of a sp e c if ic  pro­
je c t  with le is u re ,  an attempt to re - in teg ra te  le isure  and labor into a
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u n if ied  whole, and f in a l l y ,  a d e f in i te  movement towards involvement 
w ith  society as a whole.
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PART I I I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTIONS CONCERNING ETHICS
In th is  paper I w i l l  trace the development of Ludwig Wittgen­
s te in 's  e th ic a l  views as I t  Is manifested In the Tractatus Loqlco- 
Phllosophlcus, the "Lecture on Ethics" and the Philosophical Inves­
t ig a tio n s .  ̂ I w i l l  suggest, as w e l l ,  a perspective from which to  
understand th is  development as In tim ate ly  bound up with technology, 
which I take to be the primary c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  our age.
The Tractatus Log Ico-PhIlosophlcus. focal point of W ittgenste in 's  
early  period, attempts to posit a p r is t in e ,  c ry s ta l l in e  world, one 
in which there is a d ire c t  re la tionsh ip  between words and objects .
This world Is a logical or s c ie n t i f ic  one and eth ics Is a topic of  
which we cannot speak. Rather, eth ics  shows I t s e l f .  The Tractatus  
takes I ts  primary motivation from an Insight about language, one 
which W ittgenstein la te r  recants. This Is the p icture  theory of 
language, a theory In which words correspond to  objects, and propo­
s it io n s  (a s p e c if ic  re la tionsh ip  between certa in  words) correspond
to re la tions  among objects. This theory o f  language leads W Ittgen-
2
ste in  to r e s t r ic t  the 'world' to fa c ts ,  and to re s t r ic t  meaningful 
or sens lea I language to that expressing fac ts .  Ethics Is not in the 
realm of fa c ts ,  not In the world, but rather Is transcendent.3 I t  
Is ,  therefore , nonsense^ to speak o f e th ic s ,  for when we speak we can 
only p icture  fa c ts ,  and eth ics is not fa c tu a l .  W ittgenste in 's  r e a l i t y  
In the Tractatus Is dichotomized Into a realm of facts and a realm of
va lues .5
I
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E t h i c s  i s  c l e a r l y  o f  g r e a t  im p o r t a n c e  f o r  t h e  W i t t g e n s t e i n  o f  
t h e  T r a c t a t u s  p e r i o d ,  h o w e v e r  as  s o m e th in g  t r a n s c e n d e n t ,  t h e r e  can  
be  n o  k n o w le d g e  c l a i m s  a b o u t  e t h i c s ,  i t  c a n n o t  be c o n s id e r e d  t r u e  
o r  f a i s e .  W i t t g e n s t e i n  i s  t h u s  In  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  a f f i r m i n g  t h e  
c l a i m  o f  e t h i c s  w h i l e  y e t  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  c o n s t r u c t  a w o r l d  w h ic h  i s  
p u r e l y  s c i e n t i f i c  o r  l o g i c a l ,  and  w h ic h  i s  c o n s e q u e n t l y  I n  n o  need  
o f  e t h i c s  o r  v a l u e .  T h i s  m e t a p h y s i c s  o f  t h e  T r a c t a t u s  has  many i n ­
t e r e s t i n g  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  b u t  I w o u ld  l i k e  t o  s u g g e s t  o n l y  o n e .  The  
d i v i s i o n  o f  r e a l i t y  I n t o  tw o  r e a lm s ,  one  se n s  l e a l  and f a c t u a l ,  t h e  
o t h e r  n o n s e n s ic a l  and  v a l u a t i v e ,  t e n d s  t o  a c t  t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e  e t h i c a l  
r e a lm  f r o m  d e s t r u c t i o n  i n  t h e  w o r l d ,  t h e  f a c t u a l .  In  an a g e  w h ic h  
a p p e a rs  t o  b e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  f a c t s ,  b y  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  
b y  i t e m s  and  d e t a i l s ,  and  In  w h ic h  v a lu e s  t e n d  t o  be subsumed t o  
f a c t u a l  s t a t u s  ( o p i n i o n  p o l l s  w o u ld  be  o n e  e x a m p le ) ,  t h e  r a i s i n g  
o f  v a lu e s  t o  a r e a lm  o f  t h e i r  o w n , a  t r a n s c e n d e n t  r e a lm ,  w o u ld  seem 
t o  be  one  w ay i n  w h ic h  t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e i r  a u t h e n t i c i t y ,  t h e i r  own 
s t a t u s .
We may f i n d  o n e  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  d ic h o t o m y  b e tw e e n  t h e  r e a lm s  o f  
e t h i c s  and s c i e n c e  in  t h e  l o g i c a l  p o s i t i v i s m  o f  A . J .  A y e r .  W h i l e  
A y e r ' s  p o s i t i o n  i s  based  upon a t h e o r y  o f  k n o w le d g e  r a t h e r  th a n  
la n g u a g e ,  i t  i s  a c k n o w le d g e d  t o  h a v e  g a in e d  much im p e tu s  f r o m  W i t t ­
g e n s t e i n ' s  T r a c t a t u s . What f o r  W i t t g e n s t e i n  was m y s t e r i o u s  and 
v a l u a b l e  ( t h e  e t h i c a l  r e a lm )  I s ,  h o w e v e r ,  b y  A y e r  t o t a l l y  t r i v i a l ­
i z e d .  F o r  b o t h ,  a t  any  r a t e ,  e t h i c s  i s  u n r e a c h a b le .  Once h a v in g  
a s s ig n e d  e t h i c s  t o  t h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  r e a lm ,  one  d i v i d e d  f r o m  th e  
r e a lm  o f  s c i e n c e  and  l o g i c ,  i t  i s  a s h o r t  s t e p  t o  h o l d i n g  t h a t  
n o t h i n g  can  be s a i d  o r  known a b o u t  e t h i c s .  Thus  A y e r ' s  p o s i t i o n
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in  L a n g u a g e , T r u t h  and  L o g i c , w h e re  we d i s c o v e r  fu n d a m e n ta l  e t h i c a l  
c o n c e p ts  t o  be u n a n a ly z a b t e  ( t h e r e  i s  n o  c r i t e r i o n  t o  t e s t  t h e i r  
v a l i d i t y ) ;  t h e y  a r e  u n a n a ly z a b le  b e c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  "m e re  p s e u d o - c o n ­
c e p t s "  ( t h e y  add  n o t h i n g  t o  t h e  f a c t u a l  c o n t e n t  o f  p r o p o s i t i o n s )  
and  t h e y  a r e  m e r e l y  r.x>ra1 s e n t im e n t s  e x p r e s s e d ,  e s s e n t i a l l y  a g r u n t  
o f  a p p r o v a l  o r  d i s a p p r o v a l . *  In  A y e r  we can s e e  t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  
W i t t g e n s t e i n  e l e v a t e d  t o  an e x t r e m e  p o l a r i z a t i o n ,  b e tw e e n  s u b j e c t i v ­
ism  and o b j e c t i v i s m .  T he  u n in t e n d e d  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  v i e w  i s  
t h a t  s c i e n c e  i t s e l f  becomes e m o t i v e ,  and  t h e r e  I s  n o  a n s w e r  as t o  
why we d o  s c i e n c e .  The u l t i m a t e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  u n t e n a b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  
p o s i t i o n  d oe s  n o t  p r e v e n t  i t  f r o m  b e in g  i n s t a n t i a t e d  on some l e v e l  
o r  a n o t h e r  in  e v e r y d a y  e x i s t e n c e ,  and we can  see  t h a t  t e c h n o l o g y  p r o ­
m o te s  a t y p e  o f  e x i s t e n c e  in  w h ic h  t a l k  o f  v a l u e s  i s  an o s t e n t a t i o u s  
d i s p l a y  o f  im p o t e n c e . ^
In  "T h e  L e c t u r e  on E t h i c s " ,  w r i t t e n  m ore  th a n  t e n  y e a r s  a f t e r  
t h e  T r a c t a t u s , W i t t g e n s t e i n  b e g in s  b y  p o i n t i n g  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
e t h i c s  i s  n o t  s o m e th in g  s h a r p l y  d e f i n e d ,  a n d ,  in  f a c t ,  i n c l u d e s  
" t h e  m o s t  e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  w h a t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  c a l l e d  A e s t h e t i c s . " 8  
He q u o te s  G .E .  M o o r e 's  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  e t h i c s  as " t h e  g e n e r a l  i n q u i r y  
i n t o  w h a t  i s  g o o d . "  He w id e n s  t h i s  w i t h  some s u g g e s t i o n s  o f  h i s  
ow n , i n c l u d i n g
th e  i n q u i r y  i n t o  w h a t  I s  v a l u a b l e ,  o r ,  i n t o  w h a t  i s  r e a l l y  
i m p o r t a n t ,  o r  I c o u ld  h a v e  s a id  E t h i c s  i s  t h e  i n q u i r y  i n t o  
t h e  m e a n in g  o f  l i f e ,  o r  I n t o  w h a t  makes l i f e  w o r t h  l i v i n g ,  
o r  i n t o  t h e  r i g h t  way o f  l i v i n g . °
We f i n d  h im  h e r e  m a k in g  t h e  same p o i n t  as  in  t h e  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  I n v e s ­
t i g a t i o n s  , o a r a g r a p h  7 7 ;  t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  e t h i c s  as a c o n c e p t  i s  b l u r r e d ,  
o r  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  s t r i c t  d e f i n i t i o n .  A f t e r  p o i n t i n g  t o  t h e  a b o v e  
f a m i l y  o f  e x a m p le s  he makes a b a s i c  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  t h a t  b e tw e e n  a b s o lu t e
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a nd  r e l a t i v e  v a lu e  j u d g m e n ts .
W i t t g e n s t e i n  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  by  s e v e r a l  e x a m p le s ,  
o n e  o f  w h ic h  i s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  I f  someone i s  p l a y i n g  t e n n i s  p o o r l y ,
a nd  t h a t  i s  p o i n t e d  o u t  t o  h im ,  he  c a n  s a y  t h a t  he d o e s n ' t  c a r e  t o
p l a y  a n y  b e t t e r  t h a n  he  i s .  H o w e v e r ,  i f  someone i s  b e h a v in g  p o o r l y ,
a nd  t h i s  i s  p o i n t e d  o u t  t o  h im ,  he  c a n ' t  s a y  t h a t  he  d o e s n ' t  w a n t  t o
b e h a v e  b e t t e r .  Because  we w i l l  t e l l  h im ,  " W e l l ,  y o u  o u g h t  t o  w a n t  
t o  b e h a v e  b e t t e r . "  W i t t g e n s t e i n  s a y s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  an  a b s o l u t e  J u d g ­
m e n t o f  v a l u e . I t  i s  a b s o l u t e  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  n o t  d e p e n d e n t  upon  
a n y  s i t u a t i o n ,  i t  i s  " s u p e r n a t u r a l " ,  o r  t r a n s c e n d s  t h e  w o r l d  o f  
f a c t s .
A b s o l u t e  v a lu e  ju d g m e n ts  a r e  n o t  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  f a c t s .  R e l a t i v e  
j u d g m e n t s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  as  d e s c r i p t i v e ,  a r e  a b o u t  f a c t s .
S in c e  r e l a t i v e  v a lu e  ju d g m e n ts  a r e  a lw a y s  a b o u t  f a c t s ,  i t  i s  an a s ­
p e c t  o f  th em  t h a t  t h e y  n e v e r  can  c o n s t i t u t e  a ' d e c i d i n g '  p r i n c i p l e .  
T he y  a r e  a lw a y s  m eans. T h i s  p o i n t  i s  made p e r s p i c u o u s  when we c o n ­
s i d e r  W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s  e x a m p le  o f  a r o a d . ^^  A r e l a t i v e  v a lu e  ju d g m e n t  
ca n  t e l l  you  w h ic h  way t o  go  ( w h ic h  ro a d  t o  f o l l o w )  t o  b e s t  a r r i v e  
a t  y o u r  d e s t i n a t i o n .  I t  c a n n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  t e l l  y o u  w h a t  d e s t i n a t i o n
t o  p u r s u e .  T h u s ,  i t  i s  W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s  p o i n t  t h a t  a s e t  o f  f a c t s
, , , 1 3
n e v e r  g i v e s  us a v a lu e  o r  a g o a l .
We can  f u r t h e r  e l u c i d a t e  t h i s  p o i n t  b y  s a y in g  t h a t  a r e l a t i v e  
v a lu e  j u d y n e n t  i s  a lw a y s  c o n t e x t u a l ,  o r  w i t h i n  a s i t u a t i o n ,  w h e re a s  
an a b s o l u t e  v a lu e  ju d g m e n t  i s  a - c o n t e x t u a l . We s h a l l  come t o  see  
t h a t  t o  s u b l im e  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a b s o l u t e  v a lu e  judgpnen t t o  t h e  a - c o n -  
t e x t u a l  i s  t o  e n e r v a t e  th e  w h o le  e n t e r p r i s e .
W i t t g e n s t e i n  i d e n t i f i e s  e t h i c s  p r o p e r  w i t h  a b s o lu t e  v a lu e
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judgments (and perhaps marks th is  by the c a p ita l iz a t io n  o f  " E th ic s " ) , 
and he proceeds in the "Lecture" to paint the p icture o f the o ther-  
worldtiness o f  values ( th e ir  nonsense, in the term o f  the T ra c ta tu s ) . 
W ittgenstein , as in the Tracta tus , sees the world as composed o f  
f a c t s . T h e  dichotomy turns in th is  manner: Absolute value judg­
ments are not assertions about states o f  a f fa i r s  and compilations 
o f  facts do not contain e th ic a l ,  or absolute, value judgments. In 
W ittgenste in 's  book o f  the world there would not be one e th ica l  
statem ent.*5 Strangely and inexplicably he adds that i f  a man could 
w rite  a book about e th ic s ,  "which re a l ly  was a book on E th ics , th is  
book would, w ith an explosion, destroy a l l  the other books In the 
w orld ."16
Eth ics, in the "Lecture" as well as In the Tracta tus , is not 
something which arr ives  a t  logical or s c ie n t i f i c  conclusions. The 
world is facts for W ittgenste in , and i t  is facts we speak o f  in 
language. Ethics is transcendent. Not only can there be no proof 
o f an e th ica l pos it ion , there can be no argument about one, e i th e r .
We cannot sensibly say anything e th ic a l .  This, because W ittgenstein  
has made the log ic  o f  the world and o f  language logical o r  s c ie n t i f ic ;  
la te r  we shall see that he came to recognize the manifold ' lo g ic s ' in 
our language, and the s ta t ic  conception o f  the world Involved w ith i t .
Let us return to one o f  the examples W ittgenstein used to draw 
our atten tion  to absolute and re la t iv e  value judgments. One can act 
badly while playing tennis, or do something wrong in playing tennis,  
in a t  least two d i f fe re n t  ways. Phil may be acting badly by playing  
tennis (he promised to be somewhere e ls e ) .  Or Phil may be playing  
tennis badly, and th is ,  in turn , in two d i f fe re n t  ways: a) by following  
a l l  o f  the ru les, but never succeeding a t  tennis, or b) by v io la t in g
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t h e  r u l e s  ( n o t  p l a y i n g  ' t e n n i s ' )  W i t t g e n s t e i n  w o u id  a p p e a r  t o  
mean e x a m p le  a )  o f  o u r  s e c o n d  i n s t a n c e .
T h e re  a r e  two p o i n t s  t o  be  made upon v i e w i n g  t h e s e  d i s t i n c t i o n s .  
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  t o  a n s w e r  " I  d o n ' t  c a r e  t o  p l a y  a n y  b e t t e r "  i s  n o t  th e  
" e n d  o f  t h e  m a t t e r "  as  W i t t g e n s t e i n  s a y s ,  e v e n  i n  t h e  case  he  means 
( w h ic h  i s  th e  l e a s t  c o n t r o v e r s i a l ) .  Such an  a n s w e r  h a s  c e r t a i n  c o n ­
s e q u e n c e s  and  i m p l i e s  a  c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n .  We w o u ld  be  i n c l i n e d  t o  
a s k  "Why n o t ? " ,  t o  p ro b e  f o r  some c a u s e  f o r  t h i s  a p p a r e n t l y  u n c o n ­
c e r n e d  a t t i t u d e ,  i f  th e  p e r s o n  r e a l l y  d i d n ' t  c a r e  how he p l a y e d ,  why 
b o t h e r  t o  p l a y  a t  a l l ?  P e rh a p s  he  d o e s n ' t  c a r e  a b o u t  w i n n i n g ,  a nd  
s o  d o e s n ' t  d e v o te  a t re m e n d o u s  am o un t o f  e x e r t i o n  t o  t h e  gam e. B u t  we 
t h e n  d i s c o v e r  some o t h e r  e n d ,  o ne  w h ic h  i s  f e l t  as  more b i n d i n g .  And 
we m i g h t ,  i n  f u r t h e r  q u e s t i o n i n g ,  f i n d  w h a t  was m os t  v a l u a b l e  t o  o u r  
p l a y e r ,  and  how t e n n i s  f i t s  w i t h i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t .  I n  b r i e f ,  t h e r e  
w o u ld  be a n t e c e d e n t s  and  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h i s  e p i s o d e ,  and i t  w o u ld  
f i t  w i t h i n  a c o n t e x t  o r  a s i t u a t i o n .  S e c o n d ly ,  su ch  a  c o n t e x t  w i l l  
a lw a y s  be 'm o r e '  t h a n  f a c t s ,  a nd  w i l l ,  I a s s e r t ,  a lw a y s  r e c a l l  an  
a b s o l u t e  ju d g m e n t  o r  v a lu e  w h ic h  o r d e r s  s u c h  a c o n t e x t . I B  T h i s  we 
may r e f e r  t o  as p r o v i d i n g  th e  " f o c u s "  o f  a c o n t e x t ,  a nd  may be  b e s t  
b r o u g h t  i n t o  p e r s p e c t i v e  by  r e c o l l e c t i n g  A r i s t o t l e :
I f ,  t h e n ,  t h e r e  i s  some e n d  o f  th e  t h i n g s  we d o ,  w h ic h  we d e ­
s i r e  f o r  I t s  own sake  ( e v e r y t h i n g  e l s e  b e in g  d e s i r e d  f o r  th e  
s a k e  o f  t h i s ) ,  a nd  i f  we do  n o t  ch o o s e  e v e r y t h i n g  f o r  th e  s a k e  
o f  s o m e th in g  e l s e  ( f o r  a t  th e  r a t e  th e  p r o c e s s  w o u ld  go on  t o  
i n f i n i t y ,  so  t h a t  o u r  d e s i r e  w o u ld  be e m p ty  a nd  v a i n ) ,  c l e a r l y  
t h i s  m us t be th e  good a nd  t h e  c h i e f  g o o d .
L e t  us c o n s i d e r  th e  e x a m p le  W i t t g e n s t e i n  g iv e s  o f  an a s s e r t i o n  o f  
a b s o l u t e  v a lu e ,  th e  " W e l l ,  y o u  o u g h t  t o  w a n t  t o  b eh ave  b e t t e r . "  He 
d o e s n ' t  e x p l i c a t e  w h a t  m ig h t  be  th e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  s u c h  a ju d g m e n t .
I t  has  some ' g r e a t e r  c o m p u l s i o n '  th a n  a r e l a t i v e  ju d g m e n t .  Does i t
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have the compulsion o f  log ical necessity? I t  appears that he would 
answer this In the n e g a t iv e .^
How would we go on to support our statement that he ought to 
act better? What we do Is to c a l l  fo rth  the man's s i tu a t io n ,  his 
context, to him. We would advise him that he w i l l  hurt  h is family  
and friends by behaving In th is  way, offend his neighbors, lose his 
Job or be branded an outcast. I t  Is this factual and valuative  con­
te x t  which serves to re inforce (or not) our 'absolute ' value judg­
ment . I t  seems questionable. Indeed, whether the absolute nature 
o f  such a judgment could even come about w ithout a proper context.
In th is  tlme.^^ I t  Is also the case that what W ittgenstein c a l ls  
r e la t iv e  values are part  o f  the fa b r ic  o f  the social context and th is  
context always Is more than a simple statement o f  fac ts .
" I wonder a t  the existence o f  the world" Is how W ittgenstein  
describes the experience o f  absolute value, how he points to I t . 2% 
What he points to In th is  and other examples Is something which can 
never be the case. I . e . ,  something which can never be 'p ic tu re d ',
(the paradigm opposite o f  a statement o f  f a c t ) .  This p a r t ic u la r ly  
f i t s  the example he gives o f  Imagining what I t  would be l ik e  to be 
absolutely safe. What he wonders a t  Is something paradoxical, an 
example, a c tu a l ly ,  where language Is spinning I ts  wheels, o r  running 
empty. What his language t r ie s  to portray here Is something beyond 
'n a tu ra l '  m e a n i n g . 23 what he commits Is a category mistake. His 
language can 't  make s ig n if ic a n t  statements about the absolute.
We can see that here W ittgenstein Is s t i l l  t ied  to the picture theory 
o f  language. What is s ig n if ic a n t  (or sens le a l)  corresponds to the 
world, to the facts . What eth ics  considers ( In  the sense o f  ab­
solute value) can 't  be s c ie n t i f i c .  "Good Is what God orders" Is how.
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sonableness' of e th ics ;  the essence o f  the good has nothing to do 
with the fac ts , i t  has no foundation, makes no exp lan ation .25
In consideration o f  W ittgenste in 's  turn from the periods o f  the 
Tractatus and the "Lecture on Ethics" to that o f  the Investigations  
the most s t r ik in g  change is from a one-sided view o f  language in which 
propositions p icture fac ts ,  to the manifoldness o f  language-games, 
where meaning is use. The changes in W ittgenste in 's  eth ics are d i f ­
f i c u l t  to sta te  precisely  and without reservations, because he says so 
l i t t l e  in the Investigations about i t ,  but I would l ik e  to propose 
the following: I )  W ittgenstein must discard the fac t-va lue  dichotomy
(or the exclusive nature o f  th is d is t in c t io n )  and 2) W ittgenstein must 
discard the 'absolute' nature o f  value Judgments fo r  a contextual one.
He 'must' do these things in the sense that to do anything else  would 
be inconsistent in re la tion  to the greater view of the nature o f  
language and world which he adopts, in the following we extrapo la te  
from th is  view to e th ics .
There is only one paragraph o f  the Investigations in which W it t ­
genstein mentions e th ic s ,  so th is  analysis must take into account 
the nature o f  sympathetic passages where re l ig io n ,  aesthetics , and 
language i t s e l f  are mentioned. We must also consider W ittgenste in 's  view 
o f  philosophy.
In paragraph 77 Wittgenstein says that looking for a d e f in i t io n  
which corresponds to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics is comparable 
to attempting to draw a blurred shape with a very sharp outi i ne--"Any- 
thing -  and nothing - is r ig h t ."  He continues, " In  such a d i f f i c u l t y  
always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning o f  this word ('good'
fo r instance)? From what sort o f  examples? in which language games?
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Then I t  w i l l  be eas ier fo r  you to see that the word must have a 
family of meanings."
There are a number o f conclusions we can d i s t i l l  from th is .
1) Our concepts In eth ics are blurred; perhaps the same sort o f h a z i­
ness which one has from Imposing p icture a f te r  p ic ture  of faces upon 
one an o th e r.* *  2) Thus no s t r ic t  d e f in i t io n  Is f e l ic i to u s ,  no one 
d e f in it io n  may be able to  handle a l l  o f  the various possible s i t u ­
a tions. And 3) our use o f  e th ica l terras is w ith in  a family o f meanings, 
appropriate to a v a r ie ty  of contexts.
This description may be d irec ted , we take i t ,  at one who asks 
fo r  a_ d e f in it io n  o f absolute good. And w hile  I t  does not s p e c if ic ­
a l l y  rule out the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f such a 'good' ex is t in g  (Just the 
d e f in i t io n )  I t  would seem to counsel that to  speak In such a manner 
Is to not take account o f  the nature o f language. Now there may be 
two separate conclusions drawn from W ittgenste in 's  passing over much 
discussion o f eth ics  In the Philosophical Investiga tions . The f i r s t  
Is that he may have decided that the good r e a l ly  was unspeakable, 
and so he consigned I t  to s ilence. Or secondly, he f e l t  tha t what 
he was saying about language, meaning, and rules was somehow decisive  
fo r  e th ics . We accept th is  second conclusion.
In the "Lecture on Ethics" W ittgenstein uses the example o f  the 
'absolute ly  r ig h t road' and says that i f  such a road existed i t  
would be one which everyone upon seeing i t  would have to fo llow  with  
logical necess ity .*7  i t  is prudent to  ask, ra th e r ,  whether necessity  
is at a l l  a proper a t t r ib u te  of something which claims us dec is ive ly .
In summation, we would answer the passage from the "Lecture"  
something l ik e  th is :  There Is no absolutely r ig h t road. There are 
only roads. Which road to  fo llow , and why, depends upon a great deal:
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the s itu a tion  or context o f a person.
Does th is  mean that value (e th ic a l)  Judgments cannot be de­
cisive? There is a problem here only i f  we take the lo g ic a l-s c ie n ­
t i f i c  standpoint, In the realm of fac ts .  In the "Lecture on Ethics"  
th is  Is precisely  what is done. I^ the absolute good is defined as 
that which is true of a l l  s i tu a t io n s ,  as tha t which Is trans-contex-  
tual or omnI-contextual then i t  is impossible to  imagine an objec­
t iv e  value a r is in g  w ith in  a context. In the Philosophical In v e s t i ­
gations we have discarded the notion o f one true context, one which 
is impervious to values, (as was the lo g ic o -s c le n t i f ic  in the Trac-  
tatus and "Lecture") and now emphasize the manifoldness o f  contexts, 
of d i f fe re n t  s ituations and language games. Thus, in the In v e s t i ­
gations, e th ica l  value is decisive w ith in  a s i tu a t io n .  ( I  preserve 
here a d is t in c t io n  to  mark o f f  two d i f fe r e n t  language-games in 
c a l l in g  'o b je c t iv e ' e th ica l judgment 'd e c is iv e ' . )
This leads us to make several comments. F i r s t ,  we can see the 
importance o f being grounded in a con tex t, because when th is  grounding 
is lo s t ,  we are 'a t  sea' e th ic a l ly .  This lack of roots would appear 
to be a major social phenomenon today, and consequently, there sur­
faces an e th ica l  ' r e la t iv is m ' ,  whether sophisticated or naive.  
Secondly, we may f ind  in th is  s itu a tio n  an emphasis upon e th ica l  
differences between d i f fe re n t  cu ltu res , and the resulting  perp lex ity  
of how to ' choose' between them. This is less of a problem in prac­
t ic e  than in theory; however, i t  remains to be convincingly analyzed.
is i t  the case that W ittgenstein himself is led to some form of  
e th ica l  re la t iv is m , perhaps a m eta-ethicai re la t iv is m , in which there  
is no decisive, ra tional way o f ju s t i fy in g  one basic e th ica l  judg­
ment against another?^^ This does not appear to be the case.
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A p p l y i n g  w h a t  he s a y s  c o n c e r n in g  r u i e s  and  J u s t i f i c a t i o n s  In  la n g u a g e -  
games t o  e t h i c s  we c a n  v ie w  e t h i c s  as  a  human a c t i v i t y  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
t h e  same s o r t s  o f  a n a l y s i s  as la n g u a g e .  As in  l a n g u a g e ,  t h e r e  a r e  
n o  ' a b s o l u t e '  J u s t i f i c a t i o n s  ( o f  an o m n i - c o n t e x t u a l  n a t u r e )  f o r  
e t h i c s .
The  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  i n  m o r a l i t y  o r  e t h i c s  a r e  n o t  
t h e  sam e, o f  c o u r s e ,  as t h o s e  i n  s c i e n c e ,  b u t  t h a t  i s  n o t  t o  s a y  t h a t  
s u c h  s t a n d a r d s  do  n o t  e x i s t .  S c ie n c e  d e p e n d s  upon a s p e c i a l  e l i t e ,  
w hose  s h a r e d  t r a i n i n g  in  s c i e n t i f i c  p r o c e d u r e ,  e v i d e n c e ,  a nd  a p p e a ls  
p r o v i d e s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  J u s t i f i c a t i o n .  I t  i s  t h i s  ' c o u r t '  and  i t s  
a c t i o n s  w h ic h  d e f i n e  s c i e n t i f i c  o b j e c t i v i t y  and  r a t i o n a l i t y .  B u t  i t s  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  c e r t a i n  t y p e s  o f  c a s e s .
M o r a l i t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e l i e s  n o t  s o  much on f o l l o w i n g  an a c c e p te d  
p r o c e d u r e  ( a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n l y  a c c e p te d  J u s t i f i c a t i o n s  o r  
p le a s  a nd  t h o s e  u n a c c e p t a b le )  and a r r i v i n g  a t  a c o n c l u s i o n  a l l  can  a c ­
c e p t ,  b u t  m ore  upon a t r u t h f u l  r e v e l a t i o n  o f  o n e ' s  p o s i t i o n  v i s  a v i s  
o t h e r s ,  f o r  a d e f i n i n g  o f  o n e 's  s e l f  and o f  o n e ' s  r e l a t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r s .  
T h e r e  i s  n o  e l i t e  f o r  s u ch  an a c t i v i t y ,  as  t h e r e  i s  i n  s c i e n c e .  M o re ­
o v e r ,  m o r a l i t y  and s c i e n c e  do n o t  ' c o n f l i c t '  as r e a lm s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  a r e  
n e u t r a l  and  o v e r l a p  e a c h  o t h e r .  J u s t i f y i n g  an a c t i o n  i s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  
f r o m  g i v i n g  a p r o o f  in  s c i e n c e .  To  g i v e  a p r o o f  one  may h a v e  t o  r e ­
i t e r a t e  t h e  r e l e v a n t  f a c t s  (a n d  w h a t  i s  a r e l e v a n t  f a c t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i s  
q u i t e  h i g h l y  d e t e r m in e d )  and show th e  movement f r o m  o n e  t o  a n o t h e r  in  
a s c i e n t i f i c  p r o c e d u r e .  In  o t h e r  a c t i v i t i e s ,  m o r a l i t y  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
" G i v i n g  a re a s o n  f o r  s o m e th in g  o n e  d i d  o r  s a id  means s h o w in g  a way 
w h ic h  l e a d s  t o  t h i s  a c t i o n .  In  some c a s e s  i t  means t e l l i n g  t h e  way 
w h ic h  o n e  has gone o n e s e l f ;  in  o t h e r s  i t  means d e s c r i b i n g  a w ay w h ic h  
l e a d s  t h e r e  and i s  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  c e r t a i n  a c c e p te d  r u l e s
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T h is  s h o u ld  n o t  le a d  one  t o  s a y  t h a t  e t h i c s  i s  s u b j e c t i v e .  Be­
tw een  s c i e n c e  and  e t h i c s  we u se  s t a n d a r d s  d i f f e r e n t l y :  n e i t h e r  r e a lm  
has  a c c e s s  t o  a t r a n s c e n d e n t  s t a n d a r d .  T o  s p e a k  o f  e t h i c s  as some­
t h i n g  'm o re  s u b j e c t i v e '  t h a n  s c i e n c e  i s  t o  assume t h a t  t h e y  a r e  b o th  
t h e  same s o r t  o f  a c t i v l t y . ^ ^  N e i t h e r  s h o u ld  i t  be  assumed t h a t  one  
can  somehow ' c h o o s e ' a s y s te m  o f  m o r a l i t y .  I f  e t h i c s  i s  a c o n t e x t u a l  
and  f o c a l  a c t i v i t y ,  as la n g u a g e  i s ,  t h e n  i t  m u s t  be  d e c i s i v e  and  n o t  
open  t o  s u p e r f i c i a l  m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  o f  c h o i c e .  In  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  e t h i c s  
m u s t  c l a i m  o r  c a l l  o n e ,  and do  s o  a t  t h e  g r o u n d  o f  o n e 's  b e i n g .
E t h i c s  m a y ,  i n  t h i s  a g e ,  a p p e a r  t o  b e  a p a n o p ly  o f  v a r i o u s  c o d e s ,  
a s s o r t e d  s y s te m s  f o r  l i v i n g ,  f r o m  among w h ic h  one  m u s t  c h o o s e  ( o r  
n o t  c h o o s e ) .  The  re a s o n  f o r  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  t h a t  e t h i c s  as a c o n ­
t e x t u a l  and f o c a l  a c t i v i t y  i s  t h r e a t e n e d  b y  t h e  r e d u c t i o n i s m  o f  w h a t  
I s h a l l  c a l l  t e c h n o l o g y . I  u s e  ' t e c h n o l o g y '  o u t  o f  t e r m i n o l o g i c a l  
c o n v e n ie n c e ,  t o  g ro u p  u n d e r  o ne  h e a d in g  t h e  t h r e e  e x a m p le s  w h ic h  f o l ­
lo w .  The te r m  m ig h t  c e r t a i n l y  be  u s e d  In  o t h e r  w a y s ,  and I d o  n o t  
d en y  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  some o t h e r  t e r m  m ig h t  b e  u sed  t o  g r o u p  my 
e x a m p le s .  I t  i s  n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  e s s a y  t o  d i s c u s s  
t h e s e  m a t t e r s .  T e c h n o lo g y  n u r t u r e s  t h e  r o o t l e s s n e s s  o f  o u r  t i m e .
T h u s ,  e t h i c s  o r  m o r a l i t y  (a s  t h a t  w h ic h  c l a i m s  o ne  w i t h  a u t h o r i t y )  
i s  d e s t r o y e d  w i t h  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  c o n t e x t s  by t h e i r  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  
w i t h  t e c h n o l o g y .  As one  e x a m p le ,  we may t a k e  co n s u m e r  goo ds  and  t h e  
m e th o d  o f  t h e i r  c r e a t i o n ,  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and  u s e ,  t o  be  a m a n i f e s t a ­
t i o n  o f  t e c h n o l o g y .  Goods a r e  made a v a i l a b l e  a t  su ch  a p ace  and  i n  
s u c h  q u a n t i t y  t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  b a s i s  f o r  t h e i r  e x i s t e n c e  fa d e s  i n t o  
t h e  d i s t a n c e .  In  co n s u m e r  g o o d s ,  t o o ,  we n o te  t h a t  t h i n g s  t e n d  t o  
become re d u c e d  t o  d e v i c e s . W e  l o s e  t h e  m a n i f o l d  I n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s  
( o r  c o n t e x t )  w h ic h  comes w i t h  a m ore  a u s t e r e  fo rm  o f  l i f e .  I n  a
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vary raal sans#, tha world Is raducad to  facts  and functions and 
questions o f vatua In such m atarla l surplus ara consIdarad eplphan- 
onamal. With Increasing a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  questions o f  ends gat 
shunted o f f .  Things In tha world become Increasingly raducad to  
goods, become simply means; having m ateria l w ealth . I t  Is assumed 
that every Individual can s a t is fy  whatever ends he desires. This 
a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  a t  the same time as o f fe r in g  such f u l f i l lm e n t ,  cuts 
us o f f  from that which illum inates ends fo r  us, a contextual and 
focal world. By making any world and any thing ava ilab le  to us I t  
destroys the ground and basis of our values, and thus reduces a l l  
choices to t r i v i a l i t y .  Concurrently, consumer goods or devices are  
d er iva t ives  o f a va lu a t ive ,  pre-technoiogicai world, and im p l ic i t ly  
depend upon i t  fo r  d ire c t io n .
A second example is at a level where we become concerned with  
'knowledge'; in th is  the past century has seen an equally s t r ik in g  
change. Values have become commonly thought o f  as the sub jec tive ,  
and we oppose them to  fa c ts ,  the ob jec t ive .  This movement perhaps 
takes i t  m aterial genesis in the phenomena 1 r ise  of the 'soc ia l  
sciences '. In order to q u a li fy  as ' s c ie n t i f i c '  the social sciences 
always begin w ith  a q u a n tita t iv e  methodology. Whatever is the sub­
je c t  o f  study must be reduced in some form or another to q u a n t i f i ­
able fa c ts ,  which are then submitted to s t a t is t ic a l  analysis . This 
is what is known as 'va lu e -fre e  social science*. In i t ,  obviously, 
a l l  values and views are reduced to fac ts ;  th is  is done by taking  
them from context, im p l ic i t ly ,  social science must re ly  upon some 
va lu a t ive  o r ie n ta t io n ,  which d irec ts  i t  to analyze something rather  
than something else .
F in a l ly ,  the modern l ib e ra l  s ta te  i t s e l f  may be regarded as
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tending to reduce a l l  values to facts or 'o p in io n s '.  In the de­
mocracy o f In te res ts  a l l  Ideas and values are reduced to  In te re s t ,  
insofar as they are presented In the p o l i t i c a l  arena. That In te res t  
p re v a ils .  Id e a l ly ,  which has the largest percentage o f support. The 
operation o f such a s ta te  presupposes a previous reduction In the 
functions o f  language; when one speaks In the p o l i t i c a l ,  one must 
speak in a manner which Is capable o f reduction to a predisposed 
calculus of In te re s ts .  Fa ilu re  to do th is  results  In being taken 
fo r  something one Is not, being Ignored, being a c t iv e ly  r id ic u le d ,  
o r, ra re ly .  In creating a new category In the calculus of In te re s ts .  
Again, however, we see that fo r  a motivation w ith in  the p o l i t i c a l ,  
we must look without I t  (as curren tly  defined) fo r  some va luative  
base, fo r  something which can d ire c t  us and sustain us.
In a l l  three cases, those of consumerism, social science, and 
the modern l ib e ra l  s ta te ,  we see that there is an e x p l ic i t  denial 
of the Importance o f value, and a simultaneous Im p lic it  acceptance 
of some value or values. This dichotomy, which is the resu lt of  
presuming values to be unnecessary or superfluous, results In a 
c r is is  for a l l  three areas.
The fac t-va lu e  dichotomy In the Tractatus Is symptomatic o f  
the reduction and destruction o f  things and contexts. I t  Is possible  
to  consider the Tractatus as n i h i l i s t i c  in th is  regard, although i t  
can be said fo r  W ittgenstein that he f e l t  the force of value and 
attempted to  save i t  by consigning i t  to s i le n c e , and that he also  
attempted to show "how l i t t l e  Is achieved when these [ s c ie n t i f ic  or 
log ica l]  problems are s o l v e d . T h e  "Lecture" reseats the fa c t -  
value dichotomy In the radical d is t in c t io n  o f r e la t iv e  and absolute  
judgments. Again we find that ethics is unreachable, that I t  Is
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'sublim ed', and that the world is reduced to facts. And ye t in both 
we find that value must underlie fa c t ,  tha t the re la t iv e  is depen­
dent upon the absolute. The Weltanschauung o f  Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus and the "Lecture" is e s s e n t ia l ly  the same sort o f  perspec­
t iv e  that technology takes. Both pos it a world which is c le a r ,  
manageable, and not needing values or e th ics .  And both roust im p l ic i t ly  
re fe r  to and re ly  upon values.
The investigations Is then in te rp re ted  as backing down from 
these views, and reasserting the manifoldness o f  the world, o f  things, 
in "the darkness o f  th is  t im e " .^  To in te rp re t  the Investi gâtions  
as e f fe c t iv e ly  taking th is  turn i t  would have to be shown that W i t t ­
genstein no longer holds to the primary o f  the fact-va lue dichotomy 
but comes to see that facts and values are merely one d is t in c t io n  of  
our language, one which has i ts  uses, but which is not radical or  
ex c lu s iv e .37
There are three elements which show that W ittgenstein discards a 
fac t-va lue  dichotomy in his la te r  period. F irs t  o f a i l ,  we see that  
in the Investigations his use o f  language is much broader than in the 
T r a c t a t u s , 3 8  and he has become aware o f  the important position o f  
language-games; that is ,  o f  contexts, in our world. Secondly, there 
is internal evidence for taking th is  view, in that W ittgenstein is 
concerned to break us out o f  the fa lse  concepts we have; in paragraph 
471 o f  the Investigations he speaks o f  facts leading us to an answer 
( to  the question 'why'?), and so i t  seems that he no longer takes facts  
as the matter o f  logical space, but in some way almost animate, or  
suggestive. And th ir d ly ,  both eth ics  and science (th a t  concerned with  
values and that concerned with fa c t )  are taken as d i f fe r in g  sorts o f  
language-games, subsumed under language, and so both form a part o f
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human a c t i v i t y .  B o th  r e f e r  t o  human c o n t e x t s ,  and t h e  f o c i  o f  t h e  
human L e b e n s fo rm .  T h i s  i s  n o t  t o  d en y  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw e e n  f a c t  and v a l u e .  B u t  i t  i s  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e  way 
we u se  t h e  w o rd s  and a c t  upon them  does  n o t  s u p p o r t  an  e x c l u s i v e  
d ic h o t o m y .
W i t t g e n s t e i n  i s  s t i l l  v e r y  h e s i t a n t  a b o u t  s a y in g  t h i n g s  c o n ­
c e r n i n g  e t h i c s ,  and he  a p p a r e n t l y  s t i l l  f i n d s  i t  a v e r y  p e r s o n a l  
m a t t e r .  He does  seem t o  a d m i t ,  h o w e v e r .  In  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . t h a t  
one  can  show b y  s a y i n g ,  w i t h o u t  b e i n g  n o n s e n s i c a l .  Thus  he  p o i n t s  
t o  t h e  L e b e n s fo rm  by  m a k in g  g r a m m a t ic a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  b y  s h o w in g  us 
d i f f e r e n t  la n g u a g e -g a m e s ,  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t e x t s .  T h i s  i s  l a r g e l y  t h e  
f u n c t i o n  o f  p h i l o s o p h y  f o r  W i t t g e n s t e i n ,  t h i s  a r r a n g i n g  o f  p e r s p e c ­
t i v e s ,  t h i s  s h i f t  o f  a s p e c t .  He c o n c e iv e s  o f  p h i l o s o p h y  as  p r e ­
s c i e n t  i f  i c ,  as  n o t  e m p i r i c a l ,  as  n o t  o f f e r i n g  t h e o r i e s .  P h i l o s o p h y  
d o e s n ' t  e x p l a i n ,  b u t  r a t h e r  d e s c r i b e s  o r  p o i n t s  o u t ;  w h a t  i t  p o i n t s  
o u t  a r e  a s p e c t s  o f  t h i n g s ,  and i t s  p ro b le m s  a r e  s o l v e d  b y  a r r a n g i n g  
t h i n g s ,  d i s e n t a n g l i n g  t h i n g s ,  r e v e a l i n g  t h i n g s  b y  p u t t i n g  them  b e ­
f o r e  us in  a  d i f f e r e n t  p e r s p e c t i v e . ^ ^
What le a d s  t o  t h e  r a t h e r  h e s i t a n t  s t y l e  o f  t h e  I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , 
t h e  t e n t a t i v e  n a t u r e  o f  i t s  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  i s  th e  a b s e n c e  o f  v a lu e  o r  
d i r e c t i o n  i t s e l f ,  in  t h e  la n d s c a p e s  o r  p e r s p e c t i v e s  W i t t g e n s t e i n  c r e a t e s  
H a v in g  shown us t h a t  t h e  m e a n in g  o f  w o rd s  in  la n g u a g e  i s  In  t h e i r  u s e ,  
he i s  m e r e l y  c o n t e n t  t o  d ra w  o u t  e x a m p le s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  u s e s .  He does 
n o t  t e l l  us w h ic h  a r e  m os t  v a l u a b l e ,  m ore  b a s i c ,  and  w h ic h  t r i v i a l  and  
s u p e r f l u o u s .  He i s  r a t h e r  l i k e  a s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t ,  one  who o r o v id e s  
d e s c r i o t i o n s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r e s ,  o r  d i f f e r e n t  r i t u a l s ,  and  y e t  he 
d oe s  n o t  subsume t h e s e  d e s c r i o t i o n s  t o  g e n e r a l  la w s .  N o r  does  h e ,  how ­
e v e r ,  a t t e m p t  t o  show us w h ic h  a r e  m ore  i m p o r t a n t .  T h i s  i s  w h a t  le n d s
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the a i r  o f  'perspectivism* or ' re la t iv is m ' to  the In ves tig a t io n s .
W ittgenste in 's  hes ita t ion  may be a t tr ib u te d  to two reasons.
F i r s t ,  he may be more concerned with  revealing the contextual nature  
of ethics (or thought), in an attempt to illum inate  its  nature , as 
against his former views o f eth ics as the absolute. Perhaps, though, 
th is  hesitancy on W ittgenstein 's  part to  d isplay the things and events 
which focus value was an in tu i t iv e  move, much l ik e  his assigning  
eth ics to a transcendent realm in the Tractatus and "Lecture". I f  
th is  is the case, i t  may then be in terpreted as an attempt to  pre­
serve the a u th en tic ity  o f value in the face o f a technological world.
What can be c r i t ic iz e d  in W ittgenste in 's  ear ly  views concerning 
ethics is his d is in c lin a t io n  to  consider value as contextual, and 
his consequent in a b i l i t y  to see to the heart o f the e th ica l matter;  
that is ,  the granting o f value through focal e n t i t ie s  and events.
In the Investigations we are given a contextual world, but we are not 
shown the focuses which shape and sustain those contexts. An analysis  
of W ittgenste in 's  developing position is ,  however, h e lp fu l ,  in that  
i t  is a progression manifesting a way from the devalued world of tech­
nology to a world which, despite i ts  tentativeness, is one o f  contexts.
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FOOTNOTES
Ludwig W ittgenstein , Tractatus Log Ico-Ph11osophIeus. trans. D.F. Pears 
and B.F. HcGulnness (Humanities Press, New York, 1969) (O r ig in a lly  1918); 
"A Lecture on E th ics", Philosophy Today No. 1, ed. Jerry H. G i l l ,  
(Macmillan, New York, 1966); PhMosophicai Investigations , trans. G . E . M.  
Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1958).
^Tractatus 1.1.
3 |b ld . . 6.421.
^ ib ld . , 2 .221-2 .222 , 4 .461-4 .466 , 6 .42 . For e lucidation  o f  the showing- 
saying d is t in c t io n  see 4 .113, 4 .121, 4.1212, 4 .122 , 6 .52.
5 lb ld . .  6 .4 ,  6 .41.
^Alfred Jules Ayer, Language Truth and Logic (Dover, New York, 1952) 
(O r ig in a lly  1936, w ith  revised second e d i t io n ,  1946), p. 107.
7cf. P h i l l ip  R. FandozzI, The Heldegqerlan Perspective on N ih i l is m :
A C rit ique  o f Modern Technology Through I ts  Manlfestat ions In L Ite ra -  
tu ra .  Philosophy And Social Thought (unpub11 shed doctoral d isserta ­
t io n ,  Un ivers ity  o f  Hawaii, August 1974). In Chapter I N  o f  his 
d isserta tion  Or. FandozzI ably shows Ayer's position as e s s e n t ia l ly  
n i h l 1Is t l c .
^"Lecture", p. 5
9 |b ld . ,  pp. 5-6 .
10|b id . , p. 6
'^ C f . ,  however, Ludwig W ittgenstein , Phi1osophische Bemerkunqen (Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1964) aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von Rush Rhees, p. 59- 
Quoted In Hanna Fenlchel P i tk in ,  Wittgenstein and Justice (Univers ity  of 
C a li fo rn ia  Press, Berkeley, 1972), p. 228.
We may compare W ittgenste in 's  use of absolute and re la t iv e  judgments 
with Kant's categorical and hypothetical imperatives. The hypothetical 
for Kant was an imperative o f means, and the categorical one which is 
"o b jec t ive ly  necessary In I t s e l f  without reference to any purpose, j_.£. 
without any other end", (pp. 31-32) These correspond with W ittgenste in 's  
use o f re la t iv e  and absolute, respective ly . However for Wittgenstein  
the absolute Is unapproachable by reason ( i . e . .  I t  cannot be exp la ined),  
where fo r Kant the categorical was precisely  that which characterizes  
r a t io n a l i ty .
See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Princip les of the Metaphysics of Morals 
in the Cri tique of PractIca l Reason and other works on the Theory of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (Longmans, Green and Co., London, 
195977 p. 2 8 . Cf. also Immanuel Kant, C r it ique  o f Pure Reason, trans. 
Norman Kemp Smith (S t. M artin 's  Press, New York, 19^577 PpTTJè-637-
I^"Lecture", p. 8
I^We can compare th is  to an aspect of natural science. A r e la t iv e  Judg­
ment o f  value (a fac t)  can provide an explanans, but never the explan- 
andum; I t  can provide an explanation, but not what Is to be explained. 
See Philosophy o f Natural Science, Carl G. Hempel (P re n t lc e -H a l l , Engle- 
wood Cl I f fs  , 19^  , pp. 5 0 , 59 .
I^Tractatus 1.1
^^"Lecture", pp. 7-8 .
l 6 |b ld . Nathan Rotenstreich ("The Thrust Against Language: A C r i t ic a l  
Comment on W ittgenste in 's  E th ics", Journal of Value Inqu lt^ , Vol. I I ,
No. 2 - 3 , Fa ll  1968) compares th is  las t quoted statement o^ W ittgenste in 's  
w ith  Hume's famous passage concerning what should be committed to the 
flames. W ittgenstein , however, intends to be descrip tive  (a metaphysical 
statem ent), whereas Hume Is wont to  p roscrip tion . This blunts the point 
o f Rotenstrelch's Juxtaposition.
I7 |  owe these d is t inc tions  to Albert Borgmann.
18 'Absolute' Is used here In a contextual sense, of course.
I^NIchoMMchean Ethics, 1,2. The contextual nature o f th is  absolute would 
not have been recognized by A r is to t le ,  o f  course, perhaps prec ise ly  be­
cause I t  would have been so strong at the time. Also, what was tru e  then 
may not necessarily  be so now. Cf. also Kant, p. 28.
ZOTractatus 6 .37 -6 .375 . W ittgenstein In the Investiga tions , and perhaps 
beg Inning In the "Lecture" plays with the word ' lo g i c a l ' ,  and begins to  
use I t  to s ig n ify  something other than symbolic log ic . In the "Lecture", 
at any ra te ,  the absolute Judgment hasn't logical force, since i t  is of 
a d i f fe re n t  realm than facts . The transcending o f ethics from the factual 
also makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  to understand what force ethics does have. W it t ­
genstein seems to puzzle with th is  in the Tractatus 6.422.
2 Where are many topics for re f le c t io n  in th is  regard. Consider the un­
derground man of Oostoyevski, nearly a l l  of Kafka. Contrast Job. See 
also Tractatus 6 .371, 6.372.
Z^Tractatus 6 .432 -6 .45 .
23cf. Rotenstrich ' s c r i t ic is m  of th is  'simple' paradox. Cf. also "Lecture",
p. 6.
^S/alsmann's "Notes" in Philosophy Today No. 2» op- c i t .  i t  is in te res ting  
to Juxtapose Kant, who denies or circumvents th is  dilemma, p. 31.
ractatus 6.432.
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^^"Lecture", p. 5
^^"Lecture", p. 8. Cf. footnote 20, above 
28 See the Dummi t and Stroud a r t ic le s  in Wi t tg e n s te in . The Philosophical in­
ves tig a t io n s . George P itcher, ed. (Doubleday Anchor, New York, 1966), pp. 
420-4%7, and 477-496.
29 p itk ln ,  p. 205 . I fo llow  P i tk in 's  argument h e re in a fte r .
^^Blue and Brown Books (Blackwell, Oxford, I9 6 0 ) ,  p. 14. See P itk in  p. 186.
31p itk in ,  pp. 237 and I 8 3 .
3^We may e f fe c t iv e ly  d i f f e r e n t ia te  between science and technology by saying 
that science is purely th e o re t ic a l ,  w hile  technology is p ra c t ic a l .  Science 
as theory allows many conceivable worlds; technology is the in s tan t ia t io n  
of a p a r t ic u la r  world.
33cf. Albert Borgmann, "O rientation in Technology" ( Philosophy Today, Vol. 
XVI, 1972) fo r  an e x p l ic i t  analysis of th is  phenomenon.
3^Cf. Karl Marx, Friedrich  Engels, Per achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis 
Bonaparte, in Werke. Band 8 (D ie tz ,  B e r l in ,  I9 6 0 ) ,  pp. 153-154. And 
John Lingner, "Marx's View o f  Technology" (unpublished), o. 13, footnote  
50.
rac ta tus , p. 5
^^Investiga tions , p. x. See also Bernd Magnus, "N ih ilism , Reason, and 
'The Good'", Review of Metaphysics 25, p. 292-310, D71.
37p ltk in ,  p. 2 19 , 222 e .p .
38
39
See Timothy Bihkley, W ittgenste in 's  Language, The Hague, 1973 fo r  fu rth e r  
discussion.
In vestiga tions , 109, 124-129, 598, 599-
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